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While smart grid introduces a lot of enhancements to the traditional power grid and improves
managing and controlling consumers demands, it also introduces security and privacy issues.
Therefore, failure to address them will hinder the flourish of smart grid.
In this thesis, we propose a novel framework for privacy-preserving data sharing in smart
grid using a combination of homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption. The proposed
framework allows distributed energy resources to be able to analyze the consumers data while
preserving the consumers privacy. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework is first
attempt to consider an important problem concerning data sharing in smart grid. Furthermore,
in order to effectively collect consumer (or household) electricity consumption data, we also
propose an efficient lightweight privacy- preserving data aggregation scheme, called ELPDA,
for smart grid. The proposed scheme aims at resolving the power consumption data security and
residential consumer privacy by employing one-time masking technique to protect consumers
privacy while achieving lightweight data aggregation.
Moreover, we study the situation in which gateways aggregating consumers’ data become
malicious. Then, we propose a security-enhanced data aggregation scheme for smart grid com-
munications from a homomorphic cryptosystem, trapdoor hash functions and homomorphic au-
thenticators. The distinctive feature of our scheme achieves data confidentiality and integrity
against the malicious aggregator (e.g. gateway), meaning that the aggregator is not able to learn
the privacy of users or corrupt the power consumption reports during the aggregation process.
In addition to the above schemes for smart grid upnlink communications, we propose an
efficient and privacy-preserving scheme in order to protect smart grid in downlink communica-
tions. Specifically, we propose an efficient identity based signcryption, called EIBSC, provid-
ing privacy preservation in downlink communication for smart grids. The proposed scheme is
characterized by employing the concealing destination technique on the tree-based network to
protect consumer privacy in downlink communication. Furthermore, the proposed scheme em-
ploys identity based signcryption to efficiently achieve downlink message source authentication,
data integrity and confidentiality. Additionally, compared to other identity-based signcryption
schemes, the proposed scheme is more efficient in regards to computational overhead and ci-
phertext size. Furthermore, security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme is resilient
against various security threats to smart grids.
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Smart grid is a next generation power system that delivers electricity from the utility to its cus-
tomers. Essentially, the concept of smart grid consolidates various technologies, i.e., advanced
sensing, remotely control centers, information and communication technologies, into traditional
power systems. In smart grid, through a variety of sensors and smart electric meters installed on
the power grid particularly on each household, the power grid can be monitored effectively to be
more reliable and electricity companies can also control energy consumption through real-time
pricing, especially, higher prices at peak times due to higher demand. Furthermore, consumers
can benefit from it, for example, reducing their electricity bills by lowering their power con-
sumption at peak times. Despite the advantages of smart grid for both power companies and
its customers, security and privacy are still critical challenging issues in smart grid. Failure to
address them will hinder the flourish of smart grid.
While there are different components and technologies in smart grid systems such as data
networks, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, we could expect various attacks in these components. For instance, it has
been reported that there was a power outage affected around 50 million people in eight American
states and Ontario, respectively [1, 2]. The reason for the power outage was a race condition
software vulnerability in one of the component in the UNIX-based energy management system.
Other design flaws within an unnamed smart meter have shown that an attacker can take control
about 15,000 of home smart meters out of 22,000 in a simulation environment in one day as
shown by Mike Davis in the 2009 Black Hat conference [3]. Furthermore, another attack against
energy and global oil named Night Dragon by McAfee allowed attackers to compromise the
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company’s intranet and extranet by exploiting SQL injection attacks and uploading several tools
that compromise web servers [4]. Therefore, it is crucial to secure smart grid systems.
In smart grid, managing remotely-located components and monitoring the power grid sys-
tems in a timely and effectively manner can prevent overloading in the power grid from hap-
pening. For instance, a power outage in a small area if not real-timely monitored can be the
cause of overloading the power grid and what happened in 2003 in US and part of Canada is a
perfect example of a cascading failure that caused around 50 million people to live in the dark
for days [5].
Accordingly, consumers and neighborhood privacy need to be protected in the aggregation
of consumers consumption data by employing various cryptographic protocols and technologies.
The strategy for detecting and monitoring the power grid requires aggregation of significant
data from various distributed energy resources and consumers, including consumption of power.
However, consumers may be reluctant to contribute their data if the privacy is not protected.
Thus, applying some cryptographic mechanisms such as symmetric/asymmetric cryptographic
protocols is considered one of the effective means used for secure communication and privacy-
preserving while achieving data aggregation. As a result, adopting classical cryptographic solu-
tions might be not applicable and be infeasible in low-cost smart grid devices or smart meters
due to several factors of speed and sophisticated encryption/decryption operations used in the
deployed components and distributed energy resources. Hence, a combination of various en-
cryption protocols and lightweight cryptographic techniques in particular can help in security
and consumers privacy.
Therefore, the main motivation of this study is to propose a new framework for privacy-
preserving data sharing in smart grid shown in Fig 1.1, as well as privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation scheme for smart grid, which have some unique properties to defend against various
security and privacy issues when collecting consumers’ power consumption data.
The proposed scheme uses a combination of cryptographic protocols i.e., a homomorphic
encryption and proxy re-encryption techniques in addition to bilinear pairing as the bases of the
proposed scheme. The proposed schemes help in protecting user privacy and satisfying security
requirements in smart grid.
1.2 Objective and Contributions
Our objective is to design a privacy-preserving data sharing framework for smart grid, includ-
ing an efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme aiming at resolving the
power usage data security and residential consumer privacy. Furthermore, a security-enhanced
2
Figure 1.1: Smart grid system
data aggregation scheme based on a homomorphic cryptosystem, trapdoor hash functions and
homomorphic authenticators is proposed in order to achieve data confidentiality and integrity
against the malicious aggregator (e.g. gateway). An efficient and privacy-preserving downlink
communication scheme for smart grid based on identity-based signcryption is also proposed in
order to protect consumers privacy. The main contributions of this thesis include:
• We propose a novel data sharing framework for the smart grid [6], where we combine the
two popular infrastructure: the smart grid and cloud computing together. In particular, we
allow the electricity consumption reports generated in the smart grid to be stored in the
cloud, and the distributed energy resources can obtain the statistics and analysis results
from the cloud computing. Hence, our proposed framework can take advantage of cloud
computing for the smart grid. The proposed framework makes use of the homomorphic
encryption technique to facilitate the statistics and analysis on the encrypted electricity
consumption reports, and the proxy re-encryption technique to keep the statistics and anal-
ysis results secret from the cloud.
• By considering residential user privacy and efficiency issues in data aggregation in a Res-
idential Area Network (RAN) of smart meter devices, we propose ELPDA, an efficient
lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme to address security and privacy
challenges [7]. In ELPDA, based on one-time masking technique, each smart meter’s data
can be efficiently encrypted and aggregated. Compared with popular Paillier Cryptosystem
based aggregation (PCBA) algorithm applied in smart grid [8–10], the proposed ELPDA
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is much more efficient, reducing the aggregation delay in the whole RAN. Extensive sim-
ulations demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed ELPDA scheme. ELPDA outperforms
the PCBA algorithms in terms of average aggregation delay in smart grid.
• Inspired by the facts that gateways may be corrupted, we present a security-enhanced data
aggregation scheme from trapdoor hash functions, Pailliar encryption and homomorphic
authenticators [11]. To the best of our knowledge our proposed scheme is the first one
against malicious gateways and a successful attempt to construct authentication schemes
from trapdoor hash functions with key exposure. Security analysis id given to show the
proposed scheme is secure. Detailed performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed
scheme is indeed significantly more efficient than the existing schemes in terms of both
communication and computational overheads.
• We also propose an identity-based signcryption scheme implemented concealing technique
for downlink communication in smart gird in order to protect consumer privacy, authen-
ticity and data integrity [12]. The proposed scheme (EIBSC) is based on a tree-based net-
work in which downlink communication can be more efficient using minimum spanning
trees and privacy preservation is provided using the concealing destination technique. The
proposed scheme (EIBSC) is much more efficient in terms of computational costs and ci-
phertext size compared to other signcryption schemes and outperforms existing competing
schemes.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces an overview on smart grid, associ-
ated security issues, applied cryptography to smart grid and related work. In Chapter 3, we
discuss an efficient lightweight privacy- preserving data aggregation scheme for smart grid as
well as algorithms used in a data aggregation tree and hop-by-hop authentication and forward-
ing, followed by security analysis and evaluation. In Chapter 4, we present a security-enhanced
data aggregation scheme against malicious gateways for smart grid and provide security analy-
sis and performance evaluation. In Chapter 5, we present a framework for privacy-preserving
data sharing in smart grid, followed by security analysis and evaluation. Chapter 6 discusses an
efficient and privacy-preserving smart grid downlink communication scheme based on identity
based signcryption as well as the concealing destination technique, followed by a comparison




Background and Literature Review
2.1 An Overview of Smart Grid
Smart grid is the next generation power system that delivers electricity from the utility to its cus-
tomers. Smart grid is more efficient and reliable electricity system than existing power systems.
Essentially, smart grid integrates the network of generation, transmission, distribution lines and
advanced sensing technologies, into traditional power systems as shown in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The conceptual smart grid: next generation power grid equipped with advanced
sensing, control, information and communication technologies (Courtesy of [13])
The main difference between smart grid and the traditional power grid is the information
flows. In the traditional power grid, there only exist the one-way electrical flows, i.e., electric-
ity utilities only deliver power to consumers. While in smart grid, there additionally exists a
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two-way information flow communication. As shown in Fig. 2.2, in smart grid, the two-way
information flows are almost parallel to the one-way power flows, except that the control center
is also involved in the information flows. The control center can adjust the power grid, such
as the amount of power generation in the next period, based on the statistics and analysis of
electricity consumption reports from the consumers. It is fair to say that the collected electricity
consumption reports are the key to allow the smart grid to be truly smart.
There are a lot of benefits associated with smart grid for both consumers and power utili-
ties [14], including the efficient transmission of power, quick restoration of power after serious
power disturbances, reduction of peak demand and giving consumers control. The latter is very
important in terms of saving consumers money by giving consumers information and tools that
enable them to make decisions about their power use. Also, consumers in smart grid participate
more than in traditional power systems due to the two-way data communications of smart grid
for control and monitoring. More precisely, consumers no longer wait for their monthly bill they
can view their power consumption in a timely manner and accurate data at will.
2.2 Smart Grid Security and Privacy
As mentioned earlier, smart grid is composed of various technologies, components, and a wide
range of distributed energy resources, i.e., renewable energy and electric vehicles. Of these, ad-
vanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is a vital subsystem of the smart grid. Smart meters are
one of critical components of AMI. Smart meters are responsible for reading consumer energy
usages and send them to collectors before they reach the utility center. In fact, consumers energy
data sent through smart meters is vulnerable to be intercepted or overhearing by an adversary
in various ways. For example, the consumer usage transmitted over a wireless communication
channel between a smart meter and utility could be monitored by another party. Not only attack-
ers can take advantage of violating consumer’s data, but also third parties that are not under the
control of the government might misuse consumer privacy especially in the distributed energy
resources. In addition, smart meters data could be read and compromised before it is being sent
to the utility disclosing sensitive information such as consumers’ activities and lifestyles which
might be sold to other third parties violating customers privacy [15]. For example, privacy is
not violated due to disclosing sensitive data to unwanted entities, but also sniffing and analyzing
collected data from smart meters among several sessions can detect and reveal the presence of
people at their homes [16], which might be used for burglaries in the worst case.
Another indirectly privacy violation is when utilities provide third parties with information
from smart meters beyond billing and their ordinary supplying purposes. Consequently, this in-
formation could be exploited by the third parties for detecting and extracting power signatures
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of intelligent devices and types of appliances being used in homes, and then they sell this in-
formation to appliances companies in order to make any profit. Later on we will show why
and how third-party companies cannot also be treated as trustworthy entities. Obviously, this is a
good example on how third-party companies use consumers’ power consumption for commercial
purposes.
On the other hand, intercepting and manipulating consumers’ power readings sent by smart
meters are not necessary to violate privacy and bad for malicious consumers. For example,
malicious consumers can manipulate their power usage or fabricate collected data using different
tools that modify their usages, especially in the absence of cryptographic protocols or in the
presence of employing weak encryption protocols. Accordingly, consumer scams and fraud in
smart grid can cause providers lots of losses; it has been estimated to $6 billion just in the US
alone [17]. Clearly, the protection of power consumption in data aggregation in smart grid is a
must not only for consumers privacy protection, but also for the utilities’ and service providers’
rights.
The collected electricity consumption reports should be of encryption form when they are
transmitted over the smart grid since they are the part of consumers privacy [11]. Otherwise, se-
curity and privacy concerns from electricity customers could become a major barrier to adopting
such a great technology, which can make our power grid smarter and more reliable, resilient, and
environmentally friendly. When there only an energy source exists, this problem can be handled
by using traditional encryption schemes, since the only one control center is usually controlled by
the government and it can be considered as a trusted party. However, the real situation is not so
simple, especially the distributed energy resources, featured with small-scale power generation
technologies and renewable energy sources, have been considered as a necessary supplement for
smart grid [18, 19]. It is also known as “micro-grid”.
Furthermore, not all the distributed energy resources are under the control of the government,
hence it is not acceptable that all of them are trusted. Now, we are in a dilemma that the electricity
consumption reports should be analyzed by the energy resources while the individual data can
be still protected. One trivial solution is to anonymize the data before being sent to the energy
resources for analysis. However, it will significantly increase the communication cost since
the massive anonymized data should be sent to every resource and there could be also a lot
of resources in an area. A possible improvement is to let some third party to do the analysis
instead of the energy resources, and only the analysis results are sent to the energy resources.
Nevertheless, the third party would also know the analysis results, which is not desired for the
energy resources due to some business reasons. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient
approach so far to this problem in the context of privacy-preserving smart grid.
Although smart grid can assist in transforming the traditional power industry, playing a piv-
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otal role in maintaining high levels of reliability, efficiency, and manageability with two-way
communications, it also introduces cyber vulnerabilities into the grid [20–23]. Failure to address
these security problems will hinder the modernization of the aging power grid. For example, it
is reported that an attacker only with $500 in equipment and a basic electrical background could
seize command of smart grid’s two-way communication system for sabotage. Once the two-way
communication system were penetrated, the attacker could cause a blackout by either gaining
control of possibly millions of meters on the grid and simultaneously shutting them down or
disrupting the load balance of the local system by suddenly decreasing or increasing the demand
for power [24].
Figure 2.2: Communication architecture for the smart grid
2.3 Applied Cryptography to Smart Grid
In this section, we give an overview of some cryptographic techniques widely used in many
standards, technologies and academic work recommended for smart grid. As a matter of fact, in
smart grid different family cryptographic protocols have solved significant security emerging is-
sues, as well as privacy protection. For instance, some cryptographic protocols are committed to
providing mechanisms to protect consumers privacy while achieving data aggregation in smart
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meters. Apart from consumer privacy preservation, a combination of cryptographic protocols
can help in solving other security and privacy issues. For example, we can combine a homomor-
phic encryption and proxy re-encryption techniques in order to protect consumers privacy and
collected data among distributed energy resources.
In fact, we take advantage of some specific cryptographic techniques such as symmetric/asymmetric
cryptosystems, proxy re-encryption and homomorphic cryptosystem to achieve privacy-preserving
data aggregation and privacy-preserving data sharing. In the following subsections we will in-
troduce the basic concepts of the aforementioned techniques used in this study and they will be
examined in more detail in several chapters later.
2.3.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptosystems
Cryptographic systems can be classified based on several criteria [25], but are not limited, the
type of operations employed on transforming inputs into ciphertext, the way in which inputs are
processed, and the number of keys used. Among these criteria, we are interested in the latter,
namely encryption keys. The system that uses the same key i.e., for encryption and decryption
is referred to as symmetric-key cryptography, while public-key or asymmetric is used to refer
to the system applying different keys e.g., one key is for encryption and the other is for decryp-
tion. Both of them have advantages and disadvantages and they together can have a number of
complementary advantages. Menezes et al. [26] outline some advantages and disadvantages of
employing symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, and compare between them in terms of 1)
key length as an important security parameter, 2) being used to build hash functions, 3) compu-
tational performance, and 5) digital signature requirements.
In addition to that, we consider the aforementioned cryptographic protocols implemented in
smart grid in regard to security and privacy, network load, system robustness and scalability,
and the total computation. In smart grid, various schemes have been proposed on the base of
asymmetric encryption for a variety of security purposes e.g., authentication, batch verification
and privacy-preserving schemes. Most of them are based on RSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
and Paillier cryptosystems. The Paillier cryptosystem is important to the current research due to
the additive homomorphic encryption property over which computations such as multiplication
on encrypted data can be carried out.
2.3.2 Proxy Re-encryption
The main goal of proxy re-encryption is to securely enable the re-encryption of cipher-texts (e.g.,
encrypted power consumption) under one public key to another public key, without relying on a
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trusted party. It allows distributed energy resources to obtain the statistics and analysis without
revealing the private key of the trusted authority (TA) to the distributed energy resources. For
example, let assume Alice want to delegate her email to Bob, but she does not want him to know
her secret key used for decrypting messages. This is where proxy re-encryption helps Alice in
this case and we will use Blaze’s et al. scheme [27] to solve Alice’s email delegation. Blaze’s et
al. scheme is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem, and uses four algorithms as follows:
1) Key Generation
Let G be a cyclic group of order p, and g be a generator of G. Alice chooses an x randomly as
her private key where x ∈ [1, p − 1]. Alice’s public key is gx. Similarly, Bob’s private key is y
and his public key is gy. The re-encryption key RKA→B is y/x = y.x−1(modp), where x−1 is
the inverse of x.
2) Encryption
Let m be a message ∈ G , and r is selected randomly from Z∗p. Any message to Alice can be
encrypted using her public key gx and r as in the following formula:
Enc(m, r, gx) = (gr.m, gxr).
3) Decryption







When the proxy re-encryption algorithm receives encrypted messages to Alice, it re-encrypts
them using the re-encryption key RKA→B, and then sends them to Bob. The following table
illustrates the proxy re-encryption process.
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Table 2.1: Proxy re-encryption algorithm
Alice Proxy Bob
(gr.m, (gxr)RKA→B)




Homomorphic encryption is a unique form of encryption that allows doing arithmetic (i.e., mul-
tiplication or addition, or even both) on ciphertext values, then decrypting the result will give the
same result when doing arithmetic on plaintext values. Moreover, the homomorphic encryption
technique is used to facilitate the statistics and analysis on the encrypted power consumption
reports. For example, given n consumers and their power consumption (m1, · · · ,mn) where
m1 denotes power consumption of consumer 1 and m2 denotes power consumption of consumer
2, and so forth. If we encrypt m1, · · · ,mn, we get c1, · · · , cn as corresponding encrypted val-








where DEC is the decryption algorithm and sk is the private key.In other words, the decryption
of multiplied encrypted values is equal to the sum of plaintext values. By doing so, we calculate
the sum of power consumption from multiplication of the encrypted power values.
2.3.4 Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
An identity based encryption (IBE) technology is a type of public-key systems, which allows a
user or entity to calculate their or other public key from a unique information such as an email
address or a serial number of a device. An IBE system shares several aspects with traditional
public-key systems, however, it is quite different in others. While a traditional public-key system
contains all information and parameters needed to use the system, a trusted third party(e.g., a
private key generator called PKG) publishes a set of public parameters needed to use an IBE
system. Particularly, an entity can use those public parameters to calculate other entities’ public
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key for encryption. Table 2.2 shows a comparison of similarities and differences of IBE and
traditional public-key systems
The process of generating a public-private key pair in traditional public-key systems com-
pared to an IBE system is another significant aspect. In a traditional public-key system ,most
often a user or an application is used on behalf of to generate a public-private key pair. After
they are created, the public key and the identity of the owner key are then digitally signed by
a certificate authority (CA)to create a digital certificate [28]. Contrary to traditional public-key
systems, a PKG in IBE systems calculates an IBE private key of an entity by using the entity’s
identity as well as a system parameter called a master secret. It is clear that an entity that uses
IBE does not need to obtain a recipient’s certificate when sending an encrypted message. As
a result, IBE provides an unprecedented practical solution to several security issues related to
public-key systems such as key distribution, key validation and certificate management, which
are complex and difficult problems.
IBE, like other cryptographic techniques, has its own blemishes. For example, since a PKG
is responsible for generating a master secret, which in turn can be used to generate an entity’s
private key, all public-private pairs generated by that PKG are compromised if the hosting server
is compromised. This inherent problem is known as the key escrow which can be solved by
implementing certificateless public-key cryptography [29]. Additionally, not all security goals
can be supported by IBE [28]. For instance, while confidentiality, integrity,authentication and
non-repudiation as security goals are provided in various public-key cryptosystems, IBE provides
only confidentiality. Therefore, we need to modify IBE in order to support these security goals
as well as privacy preservation for smart grid as we will see in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
2.3.5 Fuzzy Identity-based Encryption(Fuzzy-IBE)
In identity-based encryption (IBE) a public key can be any unique information about the entity’s
identity such as a user’s email address, and a message is encrypted using the receiver’s public
key. The receiver then will use their IBE private key that associates to the IBE’s public-key to
decrypt messages. On the other hand, in the fuzzy identity-based encryption (fuzzy-IBE) [30]
the user’s identity ω can be defined as a set of attributes instead an atomic identity as described
in IBE. This set of attributes is considered a user’s public key. In a fuzzy-IBE scheme once a
user’s identity ω has been decided, the user’s private key is computed and the user will be able to
decrypt encrypted messages with their identity ω using their private key. A further attraction is
the ability to decrypt encrypted messages with other’s identity if ω and ω′ are close to each other
by minimal set overlap or if | ω
⋂
ω′ | ≥ d, where d is the error tolerance [30]. Table 2.3 shows
a simple example on a fuzzy-IBE scheme and we have borrowed the main idea of the table from
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Table 2.2: Comparison between IBE and traditional public-key systems




Private key generation(SK) Trusted authority Entity (1*)
Public key generation(PK) Entity’s identity Trusted authority (2*)
Key lifetime Shorter Longer (3*)
Security Goals Only confidentiality Most security
goals
(4*)
Certificate Certificateless Certificate-based (5*)
Comment ID Description
(1*) IBE’s SK is calculated by PKG master secret while SK in traditional
systems is calculated by an entity and kept secret.
(2*) IBE’s PK is computed by using the entity’s identity while in traditional
systems PK is computed from a private key (e.g., a user or agent).
(3*) IBE’s keys are usually valid for short periods while in traditional sys-
tems are typically valid for long periods.
(4*) Most security goals are provided in traditional systems while in IBE
only confidentiality is provided.
(5*) In many traditional public-key systems the binding between the entity’s
identity and the public key is done via a digital signature to create a
digital certificate. As a result, the drawback of certificate-based public-
key systems is certificate management. On the other hand, IBE systems
avoid using certificates and simplify certificate management, but still
have the key escrow problem as a major drawback of IBE systems.
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Prosunjit Biswas [31] .
On the contrary, in attribute-based encryption or ABE [32] an identity ω can also be viewed
as a set of descriptive attributes as in the fuzzy-IBE scheme, but different in several aspects.
First, in ABE a user’s private key is computed after deciding key policy that is decided from the
user’s attributes. Second, while in the fuzzy-IBE scheme the encryption is performed based on
the user’s identity ω, ABE performs encryption on a set of attributes γ.
Another important aspect of the fuzzy-IBE scheme is that users can decrypt encrypted mes-
sages with their private keys while in ABE messages can be decrypted either if a user’s key
policy has been satisfied with γ, that is, Γ(γ) = 1, or polices defined over a set or subset of
attributes have been satisfied (see Goyal et al. [32] for more details). Potential applications for
fuzzy-IBE and ABE can be seen clearly in the access structures due to nice features inherent in
fuzzy-IBE and ABE, for example, while in some traditional identity-based encryption schemes
it is essential to compute a user’s privet key before data has been encrypted, in ABE that is not
necessarily essential because only users who satisfy an associated policy are able to decrypt even
thought their private key has not been created yet. In other words, the associated policy is related
to a set of attributes not to a set of users.
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Table 2.3: Simple example of a fuzzy-IBE scheme
Name Fuzzy- identity Error Tol-
erance or d
Comments
Dan ω = {’UOIT’, ’Instructor’, ’Computer
science’}






sage to Sam and
Chris because | ω⋂
ω′ | ≥ 2 and
| ω
⋂
ω′′ | ≥ 2.
Sam ω′ = {’UOIT’, ’Student’, ’Interna-
tional’,’Computer science’}









ω′′ | ≥ 3,
but not to Dan
because | ω′
⋂
ω | = 2.
Chris ω′′ = {’UOIT’, ’Student’,’Post Grad’, ’Com-
puter science’,’Canadian’}








Various researchers have tried to tackle the challenges arising out of security requirements, legal
issues, and technologies in smart grid. Confidentiality, integrity and availability specified by
[8, 33], as high-level security requirements, are the most attractive topics in smart grid. Other
researchers have tried to address the challenges of aggregating encrypted data, and protecting
consumers privacy while achieving data aggregation in smart grid. Therefore, the main focus of
related work will be on security and privacy, and existing approaches in smart grid.
Recently, there have appeared several research works on data aggregation in smart grid [9,10]
which are closely related to our proposed framework. Saputro and Akkaya [9] investigate the
overhead of using homomorphic encryption in smart grid. In specific, they compare the latency
and data size of end-to-end and hop-by-hop homomorphic encryption within a network of smart
meters.
Lu et al. [10] propose an efficient and privacy-reserving aggregation scheme, named EPPA,
for smart grid communications, which uses a super-increasing sequence to structure multi-dimensional
data and encrypt the structured data by the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem technique [34],
and has significantly less computation and communication overhead during the aggregation pro-
cess. Although the above works are promising, all of them belong to the Pailliar Cryptosystem
based Aggregation (PCBA). Different form the above works, the proposed ELPDA does not
rely on Pailliar Cryptosystem, but a lightweight one-time masking, which makes it particularly
efficient, as shown in Fig. 3.7.
Several authors [8,35,36] propose employing homomorphic encryption schemes for protect-
ing encrypted data while aggregation and performing analysis. These proposed protocols are
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [34].
Li et al. [8] propose a homomorphic encryption technique as well as an in-network data ag-
gregation scheme for smart grids. In their scheme, an aggregation tree is constructed to achieve
better aggregation in terms of communication and computational cost saving and breadth-first
traversal of the graph is used to short the height of the aggregation tree by reducing the maxi-
mum hops for the longest path. Particularly, the aggregation is performed in a distributed manner
in accordance with the aggregation tree, where each node collects data from its children, aggre-
gates them with its own data, and sends the intermediate result to the parent node. Homomorphic
encryption is employed to protect the privacy of the electricity use data, so that inputs and inter-
mediate results are not revealed to smart meters on the aggregation path, while the aggregation is
still correctly performed. Despite the fact that the proposed scheme achieves the privacy goal as
participating smart meters cannot retrieve meaningful information from the consumption of the
others, it has not addressed any failure that can happen to some parent so close to the collector
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at level-1of the aggregation tree. Hence, the close parent receives data from its children but not
able to send them to the collector unit.
Erkin et al. [35] propose a homomorphic encryption protocol based on a modified version of
the Paillier cryptosystem, and on sharing secret keys. Essentially, the modification allows them
to propose three schemes for computing the power usage of an individual, a set of consumers at a
specific time and interval, respectively. The third scheme is used for the total amount of electric-
ity in a neighborhood. While the proposed scheme theoretically preserves privacy in aggregation,
it still practically requires a lot of computations for performing homomorphic operations, ran-
domization, and using hash functions, especially when compared Li’s et al. scheme [8]. Also,
their proposed protocol requires secret sharing that might be another overhead cost in terms of
the calculation of users consumption, and the number of operations.
Garcia and Jacobs [36] propose the No-Leakage Protocol used for achieving security and
privacy goals, especially for aggregated consumption in a neighborhood or block. The proposed
protocol combines secret sharing and an additive property in Paillier homomorphic cryptosys-
tem for computing aggregated energy consumptions in smart meters. Concretely, this protocol
requires the existence of a Trusted Certification Authority (TCA) which is responsible for issu-
ing public key certificates for smart meters and the collector that sends issued certs to all smart
meters in a neighborhood. Also, each message or consumers consumption data are split into
shares, where the sum of shares is equal to the measure of a smart meter. Then, each smart meter
encrypts its shares with other’s public key in a smart meter network, except its own public key
and for one share that is kept without encryption to be a secret and used later in homomorphic
encryption. The encrypted shares are sent to the collector which in turn, accumulates encrypted
data intended to each smart meter and then multiplies accumulated cipher texts. Since their pro-
tocol employs the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem, the result of the product of cipher texts is
sent to each smart meter in accordance with the cumulated cipher texts.
Accordingly, each smart meter will decrypt the received cumulated ciphertext and add up the
unencrypted share to the one just decrypted giving the total (not the total consumption) in plain
text. Therefore, the total consumption is given when all smart meters send its decrypted total
to the collector in which smart meters data are aggregated in clear text. However, this protocol
suffers from security and performance issues. The most significant issue is related to the total
network load, concretely, each smart meter participates in aggregation has to know all smart
meters’ public keys, as well as the collector’s to establish a connection with the collector. As a
result, storing several keys, most of which are redundant, is not efficient in terms of aggregation,
and not preferable regarding network performance. Moreover, the collector needs to send (n
certs) to all smart meters involved in aggregation, where (n) denotes the number of smart meters.
In addition, every smart meter will send n− 1 messages to the collector, precisely; the collector
will handle n(n− 1) messages simultaneously.
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Later, Li et al. [37] combined homomorphic encryption and key evolution technique to pro-
pose a privacy-preserving demand response scheme, which supports adaptive key evolution and
forward secrecy of users’ session keys. Consequently, to prevent users’ privacy from being
disclosed to internal attackers (e.g., electricity suppliers), Fan et al. [38] proposed a privacy-
enhanced data aggregation scheme by injecting blinding factors into the data. Unfortunately, the
aggregated data lay a big obstacle on the billing, since the individual consumption data are re-
quired to compute electricity bills. To solve billing issues, Ohara et al. [39] adopted commitment
technique and lifted Elgamal encryption as tools. It requires the aggregator to compute a sum of
real-time power consumption over a time period and a sum of electricity consumption in a RA at
a time unit, respectively.
The data aggregation schemes from distributed random noises enjoy prominent advantages on
computational performance. Dimitriou [40] proposed a secure and scalable aggregation scheme
for fine-gained consumption monitoring, which allows users to securely aggregate their measure-
ments in a way that preserves their privacy against honest-but-curious adversaries. Lin et al. [41]
designed a smart metering system that simultaneously supports billing and road monitoring ap-
plications with an embedded trusted platform module chip for generating random values. This
scheme is based on the layered meter model, and provides an efficient and feasible solution to
privacy-preserving smart meter systems.
Unfortunately, all the aforementioned schemes except [39] are under the assumption that the
aggregator (e.g. gateway) executes the protocol correctly but tries to learn as much as possi-
ble. This means that these schemes can no longer be secure if the aggregator (e.g. gateway) is
compromised. In [39], the scheme only can aggregate the measurements, and thus the commu-
nication overhead between the gateway and the operation center is still linear with the number of
the users. Therefore, it can only be viewed as a semi-aggregation scheme.
Kursawe et al. [42] propose two protocols to compute the total power consumption in smart
meters network with computation and hardware constraints. The first protocol, called aggrega-
tion protocols, is where smart meters’ data are masked in such a way that an adversary cannot
retrieve meters’ data, and the sum of the masking values is set to a zero or any other value. More
precisely, inputs from all meters are collected and summed, while the masking values cancel out
each other i.e., set to zero and the collector can obtain the total consumption without knowing
user’s usages of power and without disclosing consumer sensitive information. For example, let
ci,j be the consumption of meter (j) with a reading (i), as well as xi,j is the mask being used.
Hence, the output of employing the aforementioned mask is xi,j + ci,j . After aggregation, the
collector adds up the received masking values, thus, the masking values would cancel out each
other giving
∑
ci,j . The latter, named comparison protocols, is based on an assumption that the
collector knows the approximate sum of meters readings.
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Ye et al. [43] studied communication security for AMI downlink transmission in smart grid.
They propose a hierarchical identity-based signature scheme (HIBaSS) for the downlink trans-
mission in smart grid in order to help in integrity and the authenticity of control message in the
downlink transmission, that is, from the collector/data aggregate point (DAP) to a smart meter.
The proposed scheme suggests that every smart meter receives a group signature from all data
aggregate points with a certificate from the authentication server (AS) to prevent forgery or re-
pudiation. More importantly, in the scheme smart meters do not trust any signature from DAP
even though it is the original one due to the absence of directly connection between the AS and
smart meters.
Our proposed privacy-preserving data sharing framework is also related to “access control
of outsourced data”. Hence, we will also review some works in this field. Yu et al. [44] pro-
posed a secure, scalable and fine-grained data access control system on the cloud server by using
key-policy attribute-based encryption, proxy re-encryption, and lazy re-encryption. Wang et
al. [45] propose a searchable and privacy-preserving data access control system over outsourced
cloud data by using searchable encryption. Recently, Shao et al. [46] propose a secure, scalable,
searchable and fine-grained data access control system in cloud computing for mobile devices
by using ciphertext-policy anonymous attribute-based encryption, proxy re-encryption, lazy re-
encryption, and transformation key. However, none of the above systems supports evaluation on
the cipher-texts.
In smart grid, collection and aggregation techniques have gained much attention in academic
research due to its importance 1) for solving some networking issues (i.e., bandwidth, energy
efficiency and computations costs) and 2) for achieving statistical information such as average,
maximum and minimum values. In terms of solving networking issues, data aggregation algo-
rithms are concerned not only with collecting data from nodes and sending them to a collector,
but also with achieving that in a very efficient method such as the efficient shortest path or min-
imum spanning trees. In addition, in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and some smart grids
topology, it is unavoidable and necessary to adopt the decentralized data aggregation techniques
when the flow of data in a network is only done by hop-by-hop transport, especially when data
are collected and aggregated from far away nodes.
Aside from statistical information and network issues, data aggregation is promising to save
communication and computational costs when collecting users’ electricity consumption data in
smart grid. Most data aggregation schemes such as [10, 51] consider a scenario where smart
meters installed in homes and businesses communicate directly with a collector, which aggre-
gates the consumption data received and then forward the results to the utility. Data transmitted
wirelessly on route to the collector is protected and further aggregated so that individual user
data can be protected and the privacy of individual users can be preserved. Lu et al. [10] propose
an efficient and privacy preserving aggregation scheme, named EPPA, for smart grid communi-
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cations, which uses a super-increasing sequence to structure multi-dimensional data and encrypt
the structured data by the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem technique, and has significantly
less computation and communication overhead during the aggregation process. However, data
are still transmitted directly from each smart meter to the collector. Zhang et al. [51] propose
an efficient and privacy-preserving aggregation scheme with adaptive key management, named
PARK, for smart grid communications, which uses an adaptive key management mechanism
with effective revocation allowing automatically updating to users’ encryption keys. PARK, in
terms of performance, is significantly less costly during the aggregation process. Nevertheless,
the traditional aggregation technique is still implemented in PARK.
While such kind of data aggregation works well in certain situation, for example, in neigh-
borhoods or suburbs where houses are scattered over a big area and far away from each other,
it may not be efficient in other situations, for example, a neighborhood in a highly dense city
(Fig. 3.2(a)) or a high-rise apartment building (Fig. 3.2(b)). This is because it doesnt take into
consideration geographic characteristics of communication networks formed by smart meters.
To improve the effectiveness of data aggregation in smart grid, several approaches have been
proposed [8, 52–54]. D. Li et al. [53] propose an efficient authentication scheme for power con-
sumption data aggregation in Neighborhood Area Network (NAN). They constructed a spanning
tree to be utilized for data aggregation. They also proposed a mechanism for fault tolerance in
which the collector re-executes the proposed MST algorithm within itself and associates a faulty
smart meter with a new parent. They assumed faulty meters have the ability to directly commu-
nicate to the collector. However, this approach has not addressed faulty smart meters that are far
away from a collector and are not able to directly communicate to the collector.
F. Li et al. [8,52], and Y. Lei et al. in [54] introduced the concept of aggregation tree in smart
gird. They built a network model based on geographic locations of homes and businesses, and
constructed a data aggregation tree that minimizes the total communication and computational
costs for data collection in a smart grid. In an aggregation tree, each smart meter is considered
as a tree node, and sends consumption data to a collector periodically by following a unique
and shortest path. Data are aggregated when being forwarded to the collector in a multi- hop
mode. As a result, the total cost of communication and computation of data collection can
be minimized. This is particularly very useful in these neighborhoods in highly dense areas
because of the following reasons: First, short-range wireless technologies, such as WiFi, can be
used, and therefore, data transmission between smart meters can happen at free of cost. Second,
communication and computational costs for data collection can be minimized.
However, tree-based data aggregation also introduces additional challenges for data aggrega-
tion and has incidentally introduced several network dilemmas into smart meter networks. The
failure of a single smart meter can be catastrophic to the data collection or aggregation. For ex-
ample, if a single smart meter fails, a neighborhood or some adjacent smart meters might not be
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reachable (either the area contains faulty or intact meters) and as a result, they could be isolated
from smart grid. In the worst of cases, the entire area will not be reachable if critical smart meters
have failed. One of the reasons for unreachability and isolation in the data aggregation is the use
of aggregation trees that enforces selecting a specific path (i.e., the least cost path) during the
aggregation, thereby preventing some smart meters in the network from selecting another link as
shown in Fig 3.5.
In spite of the fact that privacy preservation has been extensively studied in uplink communi-
cations, we also investigate privacy preservation for smart grid downlink communications. More
precisely, we implement signcryption as a significant cryptographic primitive in which both en-
cryption and digital signing on a message can simultaneously be performed [47]. This type of
cryptosystems is intended to provide essential security services as well as reduce computational
cost and communication overhead.
Recently, there have appeared several schemes on secure data and communication in smart
grid, which are closely related to our proposed scheme. Hayden et al. [48] proposed a scheme
based on identity-based signcryption cryptography in order to provide authenticity and confi-
dentiality for end-to-end communications in uplink transmission. They employed Tate pairing
and AES for authentication and encryption of data packet, respectively. However, their scheme
has not addressed privacy preservation in the uplink and downlink transmission. Libert and
Quisquater [49] presented an identity based signcryption scheme based on pairings over elliptic
curves. Their scheme can provide both encryption and signature, and is provably secure in the
random oracle model. Lal et al. [50] also proposed an identity based generalized signcryption
scheme based on bilinear pairing. Their proposed scheme can provide ciphertext authentica-
tion and message confidentiality. However, the aforementioned two schemes have not addressed
privacy preservation in communications. Moreover, since the proposed scheme is based pair-
ings cryptography; our proposed scheme is particularly efficient in terms of privacy preservation,




Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid
In this chapter, we present a novel efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation
scheme, called ELPDA, for improving security and privacy in smart grid. The proposed ELPDA
integrates one-time masking technique with tree network topology to protect user power con-
sumption data while achieving efficient lightweight data aggregation. However, with the in-
troduction of tree network (or aggregation tree), a smart meter failure could cause catastrophic
disruption of electricity consumption data collection and cause the smart meters that the faulty
meter links to the collector to be disconnected. In order to address the issue, we further propose
a faulty smart meter detection scheme to locate faulty smart meters, and then rebuild the aggre-
gation tree, with removal of these faulty meters. Moreover, the proposed ELPDA resists various
security and privacy threats, and preserves user privacy. Through extensive analysis, we demon-
strate that the proposed scheme has significantly less computation and communication overhead
compared with existing competing schemes.
3.1 Introduction
Smart grid is a next generation power system that delivers power from the utility to its cus-
tomers. Essentially, smart grid integrates various technologies, i.e., advanced sensing, remote
control centers, information and communication technologies, with traditional power systems.
In smart grid, through various smart meters installed on houses or buildings, the power grid
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can be monitored effectively to be more reliable and power companies can also control power
consumption through real-time pricing, especially, higher prices at peak times due to higher de-
mand from consumers. Furthermore, not only power utilities can benefit from smart grid, but
also consumers can benefit from it, for example, reducing their monthly bills by shifting their
power consumption to take advantage of the lower prices that apply during off-peak periods or
weekends and statutory.
While smart grid introduces a lot of enhancements to the traditional power grid and improves
managing and controlling consumers demands, it requires some changes to the components,
communications and computational techniques used for data collection and aggregation and for
security and privacy . For example, several data collection techniques have been proposed to
automatically collect consumers’ power consumption from smart meters and then send them
to the utility or through an intermediate collector. Meanwhile, consumers and businesses can
benefit from these techniques when they are given the control and tools to monitor their power
consumption and choose the best times (e.g., off-peak) to use electricity and intelligent devices.
Fig. 3.1(A) shows several smart meters devices connected to one collector. In the traditional
collecting scenario each smart meter sends directly its power readings to the utility. Since utility
customers usually spread across a large area, a long-range cellular communication system is
needed for both smart meters and the collector to communicate with each other. In doing so,
it could be costly to both utility companies and customers. Another alternative is to use free
short-range wireless communication technologies, such as Wi-Fi. As shown in Fig. 3.1(B), user
electricity data have to be transmitted over multiple hops, and the same copy of an electricity data
has to be forwarded many times along the path to the collector from the smart meter that the data
is originating from. It becomes problematic when the residential density in an area is high, and
precious wireless bandwidth is not used efficiently, and wasted on transmitting the duplicated
electricity data. The traditional data collection approach is preferable in rural areas where the
number of steakhouses i.e., consumers is fewer. Another important feature in the traditional
collecting approach is that the whole power grid will not be affected and will still able to report
directly their power consumption to the utility when one smart meter fails.
In spite of the advantages of traditional aggregation techniques, they can lead to high redun-
dancy and communication load, and might be useless in some scenarios, especially, when a single
smart meter that receives other aggregated results fails. As a result, the entire aggregated data
will be affected. In addition, security issues such as confidentiality, integrity and authentication
should be provided while data aggregation is performed, otherwise malicious users can pretend
to be someone else’ smart meter and get free power usage by exploiting the aggregation process
Therefore, we need a very different efficiently mechanism for data aggregation in smart grid to
be reliable and taking into user privacy preservation and security issues consideration. There-
fore, different data aggregation schemes have been suggested to tackle aforementioned issues in
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Figure 3.1: Traditional data collection and aggregation
traditional data aggregation schemes by adopting in-network aggregation techniques.
Figure 3.2: Example of neighborhoods in highly dense areas.
In Fig. 3.1(B) each smart meter establishes a connection with one neighboring smart meter,
which in turn, connects with another smart meter and so for. Then, data are sent from one
smart meter to another till the utility receives all information from the smart meters network.
Furthermore, this approach, hop-by-hop transport, is used not only for collecting data from smart
meters, but also can be used for aggregation. Concretely, in an in-network approach, we use
distributed processing instead of central processing. For instance, the sum of power consumption
in a building or neighborhood can be gathered and processed in each smart meter instead of the
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collector and the final result will be sent to the collector and then to the utility. By doing so,
we reduce the amount of data transmitted within smart meter networks, as well as save a high
percentage of network load and traffic.
In in-network data aggregation techniques, especially in wireless sensor networks (WSN),
data are aggregated in a distributed manner rather than at the collector devices in order to re-
duce the redundant data and therefore decreasing the energy consumption. This can be done
by collecting information from different sensors surrounding the event, but not all of them and
then sending the useful information to the collector. However, in smart grid, we sometimes need
information such as the sum of power consumption in an area for operational purposes from all
smart meters in an efficient way while achieving data aggregation. Therefore, we utilize data
aggregation tree algorithms that are based on aggregation tree structures.
The data aggregation tree is a tree structure which contains all smart meters and does not have
any loop. In tree-based aggregation algorithms each smart meter computes its power consump-
tion and receives other smart meters’ data, then aggregates this data, based on the aggregation
functions and transmits the aggregated result to another smart meter or the collector in a tree or
hierarchical structure. More precisely, data aggregation in smart grid mainly focuses on aggre-
gate functions such as minimum, maximum, average, and sum that can be used in operational
purposes such as balancing loads and monitoring. Usually, consumers power consumption needs
to be aggregated and sent to the utility periodically i.e., every 15-30 minutes. Therefore, several
data aggregation schemes have been proposed to route all or a set of smart meters readings.
In fact, data aggregation tree algorithms are of paramount importance in smart grid and
have exploited several mechanisms from WSN regarding maximizing the shared path and re-
dundancy omitting. However, finding the shortest path and constructing spanning tree while data
aggregation is performed are the main objectives of these algorithms. Thus, in order to achieve
the reliable multi-hop communications between gateway and smart meters, the data aggregation
techniques should be efficient in terms of communications overhead and computational costs.
Unfortunately, after data aggregation techniques are adopted in smart grid, which help in
efficiently aggregating power consumption data, they also have incidentally introduced several
network dilemmas into smart meter networks. For example, when the data aggregation based
on aggregation trees is implemented in smart grid and if some smart meter fails, a subarea or
adjacent smart meters might not be reachable (either they are faulty or intact smart meters) and
could be isolated from smart grid. In the worst of cases, the entire area will not be reachable
if critical smart meters have failed. One of the reasons for unreachability and isolation in smart
meters is the use of traditional aggregation trees that enforces selecting a specific path (i.e., the
least cost path) during the aggregation, thereby preventing some smart meters in the network
from selecting another link as shown in Fig. 8. It is obvious that smart meters 8 and 9 are
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unreachable while smart meters 4, 5, 7, and 10 are faulty. Since smart meters are logically
organized in an aggregation tree and based on a spanning tree, we cannot detect which of smart
meters is faulty or unreachable.
Since data aggregation tree algorithms are used to aggregate consumers consumption, we
need to improve the protection of the privacy of consumers by protecting users’ data from ma-
licious users, insiders or outsiders, and by preventing any entity or third-party companies from
associating specific information to specific consumers. Accordingly, if the privacy is not pro-
tected, residential consumers may be reluctant to contribute their data to make the success of
smart grid. Thus, providing an efficient security scheme for protecting aggregated data in smart
grid without taking account of data aggregation tree issues might degrade any proposed privacy-
preserving aggregation scheme and might involve inaccurate or unexpected aggregated results
from smart meters.
In this chapter, we propose an efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme
for smart meters using efficient data aggregation tree algorithm, which is based on geographic
distribution of smart meters at houses or buildings for improving security and privacy while
taking faulty meters detection into consideration. A preliminary version of this work has been
reported in [7]. The proposed scheme integrates one-time masking technique with tree network
topology to protect user power consumption data while achieving efficient lightweight data ag-
gregation. The main contributions of this scheme include:
• We propose an efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, called
ELPDA, for improving security and privacy in smart grid. The ELPDA consolidates the
one-time masking technique with tree-based network topology in order to protect user
power consumption data while performing lightweight aggregation. Compared with pop-
ular Paillier Cryptosystem based aggregation (PCBA) algorithm applied in smart grid
[8,10,34], the proposed ELPDA is much more efficient, reducing the aggregation delay in
the whole residential area network.
• We further propose a faulty smart meter detection scheme to locate faulty smart meters and
then dynamically rebuild the aggregation tree with removal of these faulty smart meters.
• The proposed scheme resists various security and privacy threats. In addition to that, it
preserves user privacy while achieving lightweight aggregation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our system model,
security model and design goal. In Section 3.3, we review the bilinear pairing technique and data
aggregation techniques as preliminaries. Then, we present our ELPDA in Section 3.4, followed
by analysis in Section 3.5. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 3.6.
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3.2 System Model, Security Model and Design Goals
In this section, we formalize the system model, security model, and identify our design goals.
3.2.1 System Model
In our system model, we mainly consider a typical residential area network (RAN) of smart
meter devices in a smart grid system, which consists of a control center (CC), a RAN gateway
(R-Gateway), and a number of smart meters (SMs) {SM1, SM2, · · · } within the RAN, as shown
in Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3: System model under consideration: a residential area network (RAN) with a number
of smart meters (SMs) and RAN gateway.
• Control Center (CC): CC is a trusted entity, whose duties include initializing the whole
system, and is responsible for collecting the data from RAN, and real-time monitoring the
electricity consumption at RAN in smart grid systems.
• RAN Gateway (R-Gateway): R-Gateway is a network entity which serves as a relay be-
tween the CC and smart meters to help exchanging request and response data. In the data
aggregation applications, R-Gateway also helps the CC aggregate the electricity consump-
tion data in the whole residential area.
• Smart Meters Network (SMs) {SM1, SM2, · · · }: Smart meter is an important component
that can electrically record the nearly real-time data about each home’s electricity con-
sumption. Smart meters not only report the real-time data to the R-Gateway, but also
receive the requests from the latter.
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Communication model. In the residential area network (RAN), the communication between
each SMi and the R-Gateway is through relatively cheap WiFi technology. However, when a
smart meters network is huge or the distance between them is far away, it is impossible for some
SMi to directly communicate with R-Gateway. In this case, multi-hop communication will be
formed in RAN. On the other hand, the communication between R-Gateway and CC is dependent
upon the high-bandwidth, low delay, reliable and secure channel, which can guarantee smart
grid’s two-way communication, facilitating for demand response, dynamic pricing, and system
monitoring in smart grid systems.
3.2.2 Security Model
In our security model, the focus is not only on how to provide the security of data exchanged
between the R-Gateway and SMs, but also on how to protect users privacy. Specifically, the
following security requirements should be satisfied.
• Request command should be authorized. Only the authorized request command can be
accepted by the SMs with correct response. That is, if a command is not from an authorized
entity, the request command won’t be executed by the SMs.
• Hop-by-Hop exchange should be authenticated. When SMs report their accurate and
nearly real-time data, the data integrity should be provided, i.e., any bogus data inserted or
omitted by an adversary should be detected. Otherwise, it will manipulate the data received
at CC, making CC take a wrong action/decision.
• Consumer Privacy should be protected. While security is crucial for the success of secure
smart grid communications, privacy is very sensitive to users. When a smart meter reports
its accurate and nearly real-time data, the data may disclose the users privacy. Therefore,
privacy-preserving data aggregation algorithm is expected to not only meet smart grid’s
application requirements, but also ensure user privacy preservation.
3.2.3 Design Goals
Our design goals are to propose an efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation
(ELPDA) scheme by integrating an efficient aggregation tree algorithm with LPDA [7] to im-
prove data aggregation while taking faulty meters detection into consideration and to satisfy the
above security requirements. Specifically, the following desirable goals should be achieved:
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• Security and privacy preservation: The proposed ELPDA scheme should take advantage of
the real-time data security and the user privacy to satisfy the security requirements above.
• Efficiency: The proposed ELPDA scheme should also be efficient, i.e., compared with
previously reported ones, the computational and communication costs of the proposed
LPDA should be minimized.
• Building efficient aggregation trees for smart meters, based on geographic distribution of
smart meters at a residential area (such as houses or buildings).
• Designing and developing an efficient faulty smart meters detection algorithm.
• Reconstructing data aggregation trees when failures occur to smart meters by removing
all faulty meters from the running aggregation tree and rebuilding a new data aggregation
tree excluding the faulty smart meters.
3.3 Preliminary
In this section, we give the essential features of the bilinear pairing technique, which serves as
the basis of the proposed ELPDA scheme, and review the data aggregation techniques, which
help in constructing data aggregation trees.
3.3.1 Bilinear Pairing
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of the same large prime order p, and P1 ∈ G1 be the
generator of G1. An admissible bilinear pairing ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is a map with the following
properties: i) Bilinearity: For all P,Q ∈ G1 and any a, b ∈ Z, we have ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab;
ii) Non-degeneracy: ê(P1, P1) 6= 1G2; and iii) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1. Such an admissible bilinear pairing ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 can
be implemented by the modified Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic curves [55].
Definition 1 (Bilinear Parameter Generator). : A bilinear parameter generator Gen is a proba-
bilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input, and outputs a 5-tuple (p, P1,G1,G2, ê)
where p is a k-bit prime number, G1,G2 are two groups with order p, P1 ∈ G1 is a generator,
and ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map.
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3.3.2 Data Aggregation Techniques
In fact, not all aggregation construction algorithms used in the past (e.g., in WSNs) can be ideal
for data aggregation in smart grid because of several reasons including, but not limited to, com-
putation and communication constraints, number of messages and time required in those algo-
rithms, network topology, or fault detection and recovery. While the aforementioned constraints
and requirements are common in smart grid and WSNs, smart grid networks have unique require-
ments are not identical to WSNs. For example, aggregation trees algorithms used in WSNs can
be constructed without including all sensors in order to save energy and only sensors surrounding
the event will report collected data to the sink (i.e., aggregator) as shown in Fig. 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Traditional aggregation in WSN.
On the contrary, in smart grid, we are interested in gathering data collected from all nodes
(i.e., smart meters). Furthermore, in WSNs, if a node surrounding the event has failed, another
node might be chosen or data could be aggregated without any effect from the faulty node on the
total aggregation. As a result, the detection of faulty smart meters in smart grid is not necessary
to be the same act of faulty sensor nodes detection in WSNs due two reasons: 1) the uniqueness
of shortest paths or minimum spanning trees limits constructing data aggregation trees and allows
the aggregation tree to use specific paths among meters, and 2) It is essential to include all smart
meters for aggregation in a subarea or neighbor.
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3.4 Proposed ELPDA Scheme
In this section, we will present our efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation
(ELPDA) scheme. Before proceeding to the scheme’s details, we first introduce an overview on
the ELPDA scheme.
3.4.1 Overview of ELPDA Scheme
In a typical residential area network of smart meters based on geographic locations of homes and
businesses, it is not efficient for some smart meters at different locations to directly communi-
cate with R-Gateway. Therefore, it is unavoidable to adopt decentralized data communication
techniques when the flow of data in RAN is only done by hop-by-hop transport, especially when
data are collected and aggregated from far away smart meters. The proposed ELPDA scheme
takes advantage of in-network processing techniques to achieve reliable multi-home meter data
communication in RAN. Fig. 3.5 shows such a multi-hop topology, where the R-Gateway serves
as the root, and smart meters represent other nodes. In order to achieve the reliable multi-hop
communication between R-Gateway and all smart meters, each smart meter parent forwards the
REQUEST from R-Gateway or from other smart meters to its subsequent smart meter(s), and
also aggregates the RESPONSE from its subsequent node(s) and returns to its predecessor smart
meter(s), finally to the root (R-Gateway). In addition, in order to achieve privacy-preserving ag-
gregation in meter periodic data report scenario, the ELPDA also employs the one-time masking
technique together with hop-by-hop authentication to guarantee the transmission’s efficiency and
integrity protection. Moreover, in order to achieve detecting faulty smart meters in smart grid,
the ELPDA makes use of data aggregation trees and spanning table. In the next subsection, we
describe the ELPDA scheme in details.
3.4.2 Description of ELPDA Scheme
The ELPDA scheme consists of five phases: system initialization phase, aggregation tree con-
struction, aggregation request phase, aggregation response phase, and fault detection phase.
1) System Initialization
In the system initialization phase, the control center (CC) is in charge of system parameter con-
figuration. Specifically, given the security parameter k, CC first generates the bilinear parame-
ter (p, P1,G1,G2, ê) by running Gen(k), and chooses two secure cryptographic hash functions
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Figure 3.5: Multi-hop communication in a smart meters network
H1, H2, where H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Then, CC chooses a random number
s ∈ Z∗p, and computes Ppub = sP1. With these settings, CC keeps s as the master keys secretly,
and publishes the public parameters Pubs = (p, P1,G1,G2, ê, H1, H2, Ppub).
When the gateway makes the registration, it submits its identity R-Gateway to CC. CC
uses the master key s to compute R-Gateway’s private key as SB = sH1(R-Gateway), and
returns SB back to the R-Gateway in a secure channel. Likewise, each smart meter SMi ∈
{SM1, SM2, · · · } submits its identity SMi to CC for registration, and also gets its private key
Si = sH1(SMi) from CC via a secure channel.
Non-interactive static key establishment: With the private key SB = sH(R-Gateway),
the R-Gateway can establish a static key with each SMi ∈ {SM1, SM2, · · · , SMn} in a non-
interactive way, i.e., computing Kbi = ê(SB, H1(SMi)). SMi can also establish the correspond-
ing key as Kib = ê(Si, H1(R-Gateway)). The correctness is as follows:
Kbi = ê(SB, H1(SMi)) = ê(sH1(R-Gateway), H1(SMi))
= ê(H1(R-Gateway), sH1(SMi))
= ê(H1(R-Gateway), Si) = Kib
In addition, any two smart meters can also establish their static key in the same way. For
example, if SMi and SMj are two neighboring smart meters in the topology, they can calculate
their static key as the following:
Kij = Kji = ê(H1(SMj), H1(SMi))
s.
32
2) Construction of Aggregation Tree
In aggregation tree construction phase, we consider a typical smart meter network in a residential
area (RAN) as a connected, directed graph in which 1) the gateway is represented by the root
C0 , 2) smart meters are represented by a set of vertices {SM1, SM2, · · · , SMN} and 3) the
available wireless connection is represented by a set of edges. The gateway is connected with
smart grid operation center at the utility, and with a large number of residential consumers (i.e.,
smart meters). Before constructing a minimum spanning tree that is used for data aggregation,
we need to build a spanning table. This table contains significant information about all smart
meters in a RAN such as the weights of edges and the nearest connected smart meters to each
smart meter as shown in Table 3.1. For example, SM1, SM2 and SM3 are connected with the
gateway C0 with the weights of vi, vj , vk, respectively. Also, they could be connected to other
smart meters. While smart meter SM1 can only connect to the collector, SM1 and SM3, there is
no link between SM1 and SM4; and we denote that by φ. Finally, we denote the self-loop by (–)
to indicate there is no link within a smart meter or gateway and itself. vi1, vi2, vi3, and vj1, vj2
etc. are values used to refer to the communication costs between smart meters. In other words,
these values are the shortest paths.
Table 3.1: Example of a spanning table
C0 SM1 SM2 SM3 SM4 SMi · · · SMN
C0 – vi1 vj1 vk1 φ φ φ φ
SM1 – vi2 vj1 φ φ φ φ
SM2 – vi2 vj2 vk1 φ φ
SM3 – vi3 vj3 φ φ
SM4 – vi4 vm1 φ
SMi – vm2 vn1
· · · – · · ·
SMN –
Data Aggregation Tree Algorithm:Data Aggregation Tree algorithm (DAT) is responsible for
forming a minimum spanning tree used in data aggregation. The main objective of DAT al-
gorithm is to find the minimum spanning tree that contains all smart meters constructed from
the spanning table with the smallest total cost (e.g., it is less costly in terms of communica-
tions). For instance, when DAT algorithm is executed on the spanning table as shown in Table
3.2, it will form the following minimum spanning tree:<C0-SM1>, <C0-SM3>, <C0-SM4>,
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<C0-SM6>, <SM1-SM2>, <SM5-SM6>, <SM3-SM7>, <SM7-SM10>, <SM4-SM8>,
and <SM8-SM10>. In this case, the gateway is directly connected to smart meters SM1, SM3,
SM4, and SM6 while SM10 is indirectly connected to the gateway via SM8 and SM4, respec-
tively. Also, SM2 can be directly connected to the gateway, but with higher cost, therefore, it
can be connected to SM1 with lower cost. The lower cost is preferable when it is possible in
a spanning tree, otherwise the higher cost. Similarly, other smart meters also are connected to
SM3 and SM4, and so forth to form a spanning tree as in Fig. 3.5. As a result, when a spanning
tree is constructed, we will use it as a prominent part for performing data aggregation.
Algorithm 1 Data Aggregation Tree Algorithm (DAT)
INPUT: A set of all mart meters and spanning table.
OUTPUT: Efficient Data Aggregation Tree.
1: procedure DATA AGGREGATION TREE ALGORITHM (DAT)
2: Set C0 as the gateway.
3: Set MSP=φ . MSP is a minimum spanning tree set
4: Set RS= C0 . RS is the current smart meter
5: Set SMi = Select cheapest unused smart meter connected to RS.
6: MSP ={<RS–SMi>}
7: repeat
8: SMi=(Select the next cheapest smart meter connected with RS
9: until NO smart meters connect to RS.
10: for i=1 To N do
11: Set RS= SMi
12: run steps [5–7]
13: i= i+ 1





3) Aggregation Request Phase
In order to achieve more accurate and nearly real-time electricity consumption data in the RAN,
the R-Gateway will send an aggregation request command REQUEST to all SMs in the RAN
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every 15-30 minutes [10]. Particularly, the R-Gateway first sets REQUEST which includes a
monotone increasing timestamp, and then runs the following steps:
Step 1: choose a random number r ∈ Z∗p, and compute U = rH1(R-Gateway), V =
(r +H2(REQUEST||U))SB.
Step 2: send REQUEST together with (U, V ) to all its subsequent nodes as shown in Fig. 3.6.
After receiving REQUEST||(U, V ) from the R-Gateway, each subsequent node first checks
the timestamp in REQUEST to resist a potential replay attack. If the timestamp is valid, the
following equation will be performed:
ê(P1, V )
?
= ê(Ppub, U +H2(REQUEST||U)H1(R-Gateway))
If it does hold, the REQUEST is authenticated, and REQUEST||(U, V ) will be further for-
warded to the subsequent nodes. Otherwise, REQUEST||(U, V ) is invalid and will be rejected.
The correctness is as follows:
ê(P1, V ) = ê(P1, (r +H2(REQUEST||U))SB)
= ê(sP1, (r +H2(REQUEST||U))H1(R-Gateway))
= ê(Ppub, U +H2(REQUEST||U)H1(R-Gateway))
Other nodes use the same way to verify-forward REQUEST||(U, V ) to their subsequent smart
meters. Finally, the valid REQUEST from the R-Gateway will be received by all smart meters in
the residential area network.
Figure 3.6: Aggregation REQUEST and RESPONSE in RAN
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4) Aggregation Response Phase
In response to REQUEST, each smart meter SMi ∈ {SM1, SM2, · · · , SMn} collects its electric-
ity consumption data mi and performs the following steps:
Step 1: With the one-time masking technique, SMi uses the static key kib shared with the
R-Gateway to compute
ci = mi +H1(REQUEST||kib) mod p
Figure 3.7: Categories of smart meters
Step 2: In the multi-hop topology in the RAN, each SMi can be categorized into three types,
namely i) node without subsequent node, ii) node with one subsequent node and iii) node with
two or more subsequent nodes, as shown in Fig. 3.7. Then, based on the different type, SMi runs
the Algorithm 2 to perform the hop-by-hop authentication and forwarding. Assume there are
total n smart meters in the RAN. Then the aggregated data C =
∑n
i=1 ci will finally arrive at the
R-Gateway in a multi-hop way, as shown in Fig. 3.6.
Upon receivingC =
∑n
i=1 ci, the R-Gateway calculatesC−
∑n
i=1H2(REQUEST||kbi) mod p
to recover the aggregate dataM =
∑n
i=1mi. Since the electricity consumption data within 15-30
minutes should be small in size, it is reasonable to assume
∑n
i=1 mi < p. Then, the correctness
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Algorithm 2 Hop-By-Hop Authentication and Forwarding
1: procedure HOP-BY-HOP AUTHENTICATION AND FORWARDING
2: switch SMi do
3: case SMi is Type 1
4: set Ci = ci
5: run the hop-by-hop authentication with SMk and forward Ci to SMk, as shown
in Fig. 3.7
6: case SMi is Type 2
7: after receiving Ci±1 from SMi±1, set Ci = ci + Ci±1
8: run the hop-by-hop authentication with SMk and forward Ci to SMk
9: case SMi is Type 3
10: after receiving Ci±1, Ci±2,· · · ,Ci±j from SMi±1, SMi±2,· · · , SMi±j , set Ci =
ci + Ci±1 + Ci±2 + · · ·+ Ci±j





















mi mod p =
n∑
i=1




With the received aggregate data M =
∑n
i=1mi, the R-Gateway chooses a random number
r̄ ∈ Z∗p, computes Ū = r̄H1(R-Gateway), V̄ = (r̄+H2(M ||Ū))SB, and then reports M ||Ū ||V̄
to the control center via a secure channel. The control center can verify the aggregated dataM by
checking ê(P1, V̄ ) = ê(Ppub, Ū + H2(M ||Ū)H1(R-Gateway)) for demand response, dynamic
pricing and real-time system monitoring in smart grid systems.
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SMi predecessor SMi−1
static shared key Ki(i−1) = K(i−1)i, REQUEST
1) compute sk = H2(REQUEST||Ki(i−1))
MAC = H2(Ci||sk)
Ci,MAC−−−−−−−−−→




if it holds, Ci is authenticated and accepted by SMi−1
Figure 3.8: Anonymous authentication protocol (AAP) for group members
5) Fault Detection Phase
It is worth noting that the proposed lightweight response aggregation mechanism will not work
if there is any smart meter(s) that malfunction. For example, in Fig. 3.9, we can see that smart
meters 4, 5, 7 and 10 are faulty and smart meter 4 is a parent of non-faulty or unreachable smart
meters. For example, when performing data aggregation, the smart meter 4 will not send its
data nor will smart meter 8 and 9. The gateway also does not know if they are faulty or intact.
Thus, the gateway is not sure how many smart meters are faulty or intact behind the faulty smart
meter(s). In some situation, it could be one smart meter has failed after the faulty one and the rest
are intact, or all could be intact or fail. Therefore, we need to detect faulty smart meter(s) in order
to successfully recover the aggregated data which are received from all reachable smart meters.
In other words, the detected faulty meter(s) and their successor nodes are considered unreachable
and should be removed from the current response aggregation procedure. Afterwords, all the
smart meters that are working properly will be re-organized to form another aggregation tree.
In this phase, we describe the faulty smart meters detection algorithm while achieving aggre-
gation in more detail.
We propose some assumptions before going any further and deciding whether a smart meter
is faulty or not. First, we consider any parent or leaf in a smart meter network to be faulty if it has
predecessor paths (i.e., it is reachable) and has not responded to the gateway, e.g., smart meter 5
in Fig. 3.9. As a result, smart meter 5 is considered to be faulty since it has a predecessor path via
smart meter 6, but has not responded to the gateway. In the case that leaves or parents were faulty,
they will be excluded from the re-construction aggregation tree and marked as dead or faulty
smart meters while its children are not necessarily faulty. In fact, a faulty parent is not necessary
to be followed by faulty children smart meters and they will be marked as unreachable, but not
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faulty. If this case happens, the algorithm will re-construct the aggregation tree and associate
children smart meters with a new reachable parent when it is possible. Sometimes the algorithm
associates children with a predecessor or successor parent even though we do not know the parent
status provided that it is not being unreachable. The second assumption is that we consider the
smart meters network isolated if the gateway is not connected with any smart meter even though
they are connected with each other except the gateway. The third assumption is that we assume
each smart meter has at least two different paths for communications with its neighbors. The last
assumption may guarantee an alternate path when the failure happens to the other path, and will
help in re-constructing the aggregation tree.
Figure 3.9: Faulty smart meters in smart grid
In this phase, the re-constructing aggregation tree algorithm and fault detection algorithm
have to construct sets of smart meters from which we can detect faulty meters. In the first round
of re-construction, the re-construction algorithm will construct three sets; S is a set of all smart
meters (faulty and running smart meters) and F denotes a set of only faulty parent(s) and only
leaves that are considered faulty as mentioned in assumption 1 above. However, non-faulty or
unreachable smart meters are not included in F . The third set is CS which is a set containing
the difference set between S and F , the set of only non-faulty and/or only unreachable nodes.
More precisely, when F is subtracted from S, it would be identical to the difference between S
and F , that is, the result of S − F is put into the CS set. In this procedure, we exclude smart
meters satisfying the first assumption and can track other smart meters that have not responded
to the gateway by associating them with a new reachable parent meters when it is possible. For
example, SM10 will be associated with SM6, but not with SM5. Also, SM8 and SM9 together
will be linked to SM3 according to communications and spanning table in Table 3.2.
At this time, we will execute the proposed data aggregation tree algorithm Algorithm 1
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to build a new spanning tree. However, smart meters passed or used in Algorithm 1 would
not be the same smart meters used in the first time when the algorithm was invoked. The reason
for that is some smart meters have been excluded due to being faulty. Moreover, smart meters in
Table 3.2 that have been marked as faulty will not be used as parents or any intermediate smart
meters in Algorithm 1.
After several rounds of execution of re-constructing aggregation trees, the gateway should
have received some responses from some smart meter(s) or non-faulty meters, otherwise the non-
faulty one(s) might be isolated (e.g., where we could not check from being faulty or running),
making it difficult to the gateway to make sure about their status. If the gateway still has not
received responses from some smart meters after associating unreachable meters, the set CS
is then considered to be either unreachable or isolated while the set S is considered the set
containing only faulty smart meters.
In the meanwhile, the aforementioned steps are used as well in the fault detection algorithm
for several rounds till the algorithm detects all faulty meters as in the set F or deduces isolated
and/or unreachable ones as in the set CS .
Concretely, the fault detection algorithm detects fault parents or leaves (when no responses)
by looking at the set F while it marks smart meters as unreachable or isolated as in the set CS .
Table 3.2: A numerical example of spanning table
C0 SM1 SM2 SM3 SM4 SM5 SM6 SM7 SM8 SM9 SM10
C0 – 5 16 6 7 φ 12 φ φ φ φ
SM1 – 3 14 φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
SM2 – φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
SM3 – φ φ φ 4 15 φ φ
SM4 – φ φ φ 2 φ φ
SM5 – 4 8 φ φ 9
SM6 – 8 φ φ 9
SM7 – 4 φ 3




3.5 Analysis and Evaluation
3.5.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we will discuss the security of the proposed ELPDA scheme, i.e., the request
command’s authentication, hop-by-hop authentication, and user data privacy preservation in ag-
gregation.
• The proposed ELPDA scheme can provide the request command’s authentication. When
the R-Gateway sends a REQUEST to all HANs in the building, it also attaches the signature
(U, V ), where U = rH1(R-Gateway), V = (r + H2(REQUEST||U))SB. Since the signature
(U, V ) is provably secure in the random oracle model [61], it can resist deliberate forgery attacks.
In other words, the proposed ELPDA scheme can provide the request command’s authentication.
In addition, since REQUEST includes a monotone increasing timestamp, which can resist the
possible replay attack as well.
• The proposed ELPDA scheme provides the hop-by-hop authentication. Because of the
unique timestamp in REQUEST, the session key sk = H2(REQUEST||Ki(i−1)) for SMi and
SMi−1 in Fig. 3.8 secure and distinct each other. As a result, with the fresh sk in MAC =
H1(Ci||sk),HANi−1 can authenticateCi really comes from its subsequent nodeHANi. Suppose
an adversary wants to insert a bogus data to pollute the result C =
∑n
i=1 ci. In order to make it
successful, the adversary must guess at least one correct value of MAC in total n hop-by-hop
forwarding. Since the hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p has possible q outputs, the probability
that the adversary can pollute the aggregated result C =
∑n
i=1 ci is 1− (1−
1
p
)n. When q is large
enough, i.e., n
p
→ 0, we know
1− (1− 1
p
)n ≈ 1− e−
n
p → 0
which shows that the proposed ELPDA scheme can provide the hop-by-hop authentication and
resist any bogus data inserting attack during the aggregation phase.
• The proposed ELPDA scheme provides user data privacy preservation in aggregation. In
the proposed ELPDA scheme, each SMi’s data mi is masked by H2(REQUEST||kib) in ci =
mi + H2(REQUEST||kib) mod p. Since H2(REQUEST||kib) won’t be used more than once, the




mi +H2(REQUEST||kib) mod p
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is reported to the R-Gateway, each mi is still hidden. Due to these reasons, the proposed ELPDA
scheme provides user data privacy preservation in aggregation.
Summarizing the above analysis, we can clearly see that the proposed ELPDA scheme can
provide request command authentication, hop-by-hop authentication, and user data privacy in
data aggregation.
3.5.2 Average Aggregation Delay(AAD)
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed ELPDA scheme in terms of the aver-
age aggregation delay and then compare the average aggregation delay and the security strength
of the proposed scheme with Paillier Cryptosystem Based Aggregation (PCBA) [8].
The AAD is defined as the average time between the furthest smart meter in the aggrega-
tion based tree and the residential gateway (R-Gateway) when the furthest smart meter begins
calculating the electricity consumption data and when the R-Gateway successfully recovers the
aggregated data.
While the proposed ELPDA scheme and PCBA scheme lower the communication overhead
by implementing aggregation trees, the proposed ELPDA scheme efficiently reduces the average
aggregation delay (AAD) compared to the PCBA scheme. Since the proposed scheme performs
aggregation based on the modular addititon in Zn, the AAD is considered negligible [56] com-
pared to the PCBA scheme. The AAD in the proposed scheme is dominated by the hop-by-hop
communication delay while the PCBA scheme is dominated by the hop-by-hop communication
delay as well as the computational delay inherent in the Paillier Cryptosystem (e.g., a single
modular multiplication in Zn2 costs 4 modular multiplication operations in Zn. [57])
In order to compare the AAD in both schemes, we construct a perfect rooted k-ary tree as
shown in Fig 3.10 and compute the AAD as given in Table 3.3. The detailed parameter settings
are summarized in Table 3.4.
Table 3.3: Computation of average aggregation delay
Scheme Average Aggregation Delay
PCBA Tpcba = (Tagg × [(
∑h−1
i=1 |ki|) + 1]) + (h× Tcomm)
ELPDA Telpda = h× Tcomm
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Figure 3.10: Perfect rooted k-ary tree
3.5.3 Simulation
To simulate a tree-based residential area network, we consider a perfect rooted k-ary aggregation
tree in which all nodes are at the same depth having the degree of k. The height of the tree is
denoted by h. The transmission radius of each smart meter-gateway is r = 30 m, the hop-by-hop
communication delay Tcomm is set to 300 ms and the computational delay of PCBA Tagg is set
to 0.8851 ms [57, 58]. Tagg is computed from: i) the modular multiplication in Zn which costs
0.2951 ms for a single modular multiplication operation. ii) a single modular multiplication
operation in Zn2 costs 4 modular multiplication operations in Zn. iii) as the computational
delay in PCBA is non-negligible and affects data aggregation, each aggregating node will face a
delay of k × 0.2951.
The number of intermediate nodes that aggregate data is given by (
∑h−1
i=1 |ki|) + 1, where
h>1 and |ki| denotes the number of nodes in level i . If h = 1 then the number of aggregating
nodes is only k.
In order to show the efficiency of the proposed ELPDA, we compare the proposed ELPDA
scheme with Paillier cryptosystem based aggregation (PCBA) with modulus 2048 [8]. The de-
tailed parameter settings are summarized in Table 3.4.
In terms of the security strength, the ELPDA with 224-bit p is secure enough for the aggre-
gation application in smart grid, and is equivalent to 2048-modulus size. This is because we
implement the modified Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic curves [55]. More specifically, for a
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Table 3.4: Simulation Settings
Parameter Setting
perfect rooted k-ary tree of height h h = [1, 2, · · · , 5, 6], k = 3
transmission radius r = 30 m
hop-by-hop communication delay Tcomm = 300 ms
computational delay of PCBA Tagg = 0.9 ms
length of p in ELPDA |p| = 224 bits
modulus of Paillier cryptosystem |n| = [2048] bits
given level of security, an elliptic curve requires shorter key lengths which in turn requires fewer
memory and CPU resources to implement the proposed scheme. While PCBA has to use large
modulus to guarantee its security, unfortunately the large modulus will cause the long communi-
cation delay.
Figure 3.11: Average aggregation delay (AAD)
In Fig. 3.11, we compare the average aggregation delay (AAD) in the proposed ELPDA with
224 modulus and PCBA with 2048 modulus when the parameter h increases from 1 to 6. From
the figure, we can see, with the increase of h, AAD in all schemes increase. However, the AAD
of the proposed ELPDA is lower than that of the PCBA. The reason is that the computational
delay cost can be almost negligible in the proposed ELPDA scheme, and the AAD is mainly
dominated by the hop-by-hop communication delay.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation
scheme (ELPDA), including an efficient faulty smart meters detection algorithm for smart grid.
Compared with the previously data aggregation schemes, the proposed scheme and algorithms
can efficiently achieve privacy-preserving electricity consumption at a residential area. Mean-
while, the proposed scheme can detect faulty smart meters and dynamically rebuild data aggre-




against Malicious Gateways in Smart Grid
In smart grid, to monitor, predict and control the power consumption in real time, energy usage
data have to be periodically collected through publicly accessible communication channels, and
are stored in a centralized operation center. However, electricity consumption data may disclose
the privacy information of users. Therefore, protecting privacy of users and validity of power
usage reports becomes a crucial security issue. In this chapter, we propose a security-enhanced
data aggregation scheme for smart grid communications based on homomorphic cryptosystem,
trapdoor hash functions and homomorphic authenticators. The proposed scheme can achieve
data confidentiality and integrity against the malicious aggregator (e.g. gateway), meaning that
the aggregator is not able to access users’ private information or corrupt the power consumption
reports during the aggregation process. Through extensive analysis, we demonstrate that our
scheme can resist potential threats and be proved secure under cryptographic hard assumptions.
It has less computational and communication overheads than existing approaches.
4.1 Introduction
The world is undergoing the development of smart grid technology. The smart grid integrates the
traditional grid with information and communication technologies, such as network communica-
tion, control systems and computation facilities, to achieve two-way electricity and information
exchange between utilities and users while making the grid more reliable, efficient, secure and
greener [59]. The smart grid, with these appealing advantages, is able to significantly avoid
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the occurrence of electrical blackout, and automatically and quickly identify the disturbance in
the electrical distribution so that repair crews can be immediately dispatched to the problem
area [60].
Electric power systems are complex physical networks that control the electricity generation,
transmission, distribution and consumption. Combining with the communication networks, the
management and dispatch of the electricity become much smarter. The smart grid communica-
tion network deployed in parallel to the hierarchical power grid. Smart meters, critical two-way
wireless or wired communication devices, are deployed at customers premise and used to collect
the real-time power consumption periodically. The electricity usage and detailed information
about the transmission links are centralized at the operation center (OA) that allow OA to man-
age energy consumption in real time and lower the need of customers in peak hours through
adjusting the electrical price dramatically. OA also exposes the customers’ detailed real-time
electrical usage information to the power plants, which may help them to adjust the energy pro-
duction and then reduce the need to fire up the costly and secondary power plans. The customers
can access their own real-time usage information and decrease their electricity costs by shifting
the uninterrupted activities from peak time to non-peak time.
While smart grid provides a numerous amount of appealing benefits toward both users and
operation centers, it is still confronted with a great deal of cyber security threats [23, 37, 62–65].
It is of paramount importance to prevent the data from being eavesdropped, modified, forged
and denied. Furthermore, from the perspective of users, privacy is a primary concern as it is
possible to infer the users’ daily activities, habits and other privacy witnessable references from
the electricity data. For example, a relatively low and static daily consumption of a household
may indicate that no one is at home [37]; a conspicuous drop of power consumption at midnight
may indicate the house owner goes to sleep [10]; power variation every several hours throughout
every night might indicate that this family has a new baby [66]. End-to-end encryption is a
straightforward way to hide the communication content and preserve users’ privacy, but at the
same time will increase the data size and cause heavy overhead on communication channels.
To reduce the communication burden and keep data confidentiality, several data aggrega-
tion schemes [8, 10, 38, 41, 67, 68] have been proposed to compress the consumption reports in
a specific residential area at a local gateway and then forward in a compact form to the opera-
tion center. These schemes can be proved secure against gateways under the honest-but-curious
model, where the gateways honestly follow the communication protocols agreed upon among
the ones involved, but snoop on users’ electricity consumption out of curiosity. Unfortunately,
in reality, a gateway may become malicious due to many reasons. For example, terrorists may
insert false messages or viruses to mislead operation centers and make a lengthy blackout over an
extensive region, and thereby may lead to the deaths of many people during a period of extreme
weather [69]. Hackers can modify on-going traffic or communications in order to manipulate the
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market price and encourage users to increase power consumption during on-peak periods [70].
As a result, malicious gateways are able to control the power dispatch and the market price; thus,
ruin all the attractive benefits of smart grid. However, malicious gateways have not received any
attention lately, and how to prevent malicious gateways still remains an open problem.
Therefore, there should be a mechanism to prevent both the individual usage reports and
the aggregated one from being modified. While it is of great difficulty to construct an efficient
universal homomorphic signature which can aggregate the signatures generated by multiple sign-
ers [71], the challenge is how to aggregate the reports and the corresponding signatures simulta-
neously at the gateways. To address this problem, we propose a security-enhanced data aggre-
gation scheme that is able to avoid the attacks from compromised aggregators. By integrating
the Paillier encryption [34] with the trapdoor hash function [72] and the homomorphic authen-
ticators [73], our scheme can aggregate the authentication responses, ciphertexts and signatures
at the same time, thus drastically reducing the communication and computational overheads as
compared with existing protocols. Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as the fol-
lowing two aspects.
Firstly, inspired by the facts that the gateways may be compromised, we propose a security-
enhanced data aggregation scheme from trapdoor hash functions, Paillier encryption and homo-
morphic authenticators. Our proposed scheme is the first one against malicious gateways and
a successful attempt to construct authentication schemes from trapdoor hash functions with key
exposure.
Secondly, we analyze the security strength and the performance of our proposed scheme.
In particular, we employ provable security technique to reduce the security of our scheme to
well-known mathematical hard problems and underlying cryptographic tools. Through the per-
formance comparison, we demonstrate that our scheme is much more efficient than existing
schemes in terms of both communication and computational overheads.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we define the sys-
tem model, security requirements and design goals. Then, we describe our proposed scheme in
section 4.3 and provide the security analysis in section 4.4, respectively. We analyze the perfor-
mance of our proposal in section 4.5. Finally, we draw our conclusion in section 4.6.
4.2 Models and Design Goals
In this section, we briefly discuss the system model, security requirements and design goals.
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4.2.1 System Model
In our system model, we formalize the communications between the users and the operation
center as depicted in Fig. 4.1. Specifically, a typical residential area (RA) has large amounts of
residential users U = {U1, U2, · · · , Uw} deployed smart meters to collect their real-time elec-
tricity consumption. The users are required to report their usage information to the operation
center (OC) every several minutes [62]. The smart meters are installed at the places under the
control of the users, can remotely update the time and the cryptographic keys. Therefore, we
assume the time periods of smart meters in the same RA is synchronous [67]. A local gateway
(GW), which is deployed to connect with the OC and the smart meters in this area, mainly per-
forms two functions: aggregation and relaying. When the GW receives the usage reports from
the users through relatively inexpensive WiFi technologies, as suggested in [60], the aggregation
component aggregates all the individual reports into a compressed one. Afterwards, the relaying
component forwards it to the OC through wired network or other links that support long distance
communication with low delay.
Figure 4.1: System model for data aggregation.(Courtresy of [10])
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4.2.2 Security Requirements
In the security model, we assume that OC can be fully-trusted and the usersU = {U1, U2, · · · , Uw}
are honest as well. Smart meters are protected by the hardware, and it is difficult to recover the
keys and the random numbers used. However, an attacker is able to eavesdrop on entire com-
munication channels to capture users’ usage reports. More seriously, powerful attackers, such
as terrorists or hackers, can intrude the intermediate nodes on the channels, like gateways, to
modify transmission data and steal individual usage reports. Therefore, in order to ensure that
OC obtains valid results and preserves the privacy of users, the following secure requirements
must be satisfied:
• Authentication: Assure that the electricity usage reports are really from the legal residential
users and the users can not repudiate the existing reports. Thus, the attacker is not able to
pretend to be a legal user generating an individual report.
• Confidentiality: Protect the users’ consumption data from the attacker, even if the attacker
can eavesdrop WiFi communication channel and corrupt the local gateways. In such way,
the privacy of users and the contents of usage reports will not be disclosed during the
transmission.
• Integrity: Prevent the usage reports from being modified by the attacker when they are
transmitting on links, which means that any alternation on the reports, either the individual
one or the compressed one, must be detected by OC when reading the report. Therefore,
OC receives the legitimate result and ignores all the ill reports.
4.2.3 Design Goals
To enable security-enhanced data aggregation under the aforementioned system model and the
security requirements, our scheme should achieve following objectives:
• Security: As mentioned above, three aspects of security requirements should be satisfied
for our new scheme that ensures OC can receive the authentic and reliable information. The
users’ privacy should also not be disclosed as well. The proposed scheme should prevent
the malicious gateways from modifying the usage reports, so that the overall consumption
is available and trustful.
• Efficiency: In terms of efficiency, the computational cost is required to be low since smart
meters are the devices that have limited computation power. There should be no time-
consuming operations, such as pairing computation, on the users’ side. In addition, the
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new scheme should consider the communication-effectiveness, thus, OC can receive real-
time usage reports in short delay.
4.3 Proposed scheme
In this section, we present our security-enhanced data aggregation scheme for smart grid com-
munications by utilizing the trapdoor hash function [72], the Paillier cryptosystem [34] and the
homomorphic authenticators [73], which mainly consists of five phases: system initialization,
user registration, report generation, report aggregation and report reading.
4.3.1 System Initialization
In a single-authority smart grid system, OC acts as a trusted authority to bootstrap the whole sys-
tem. In the system initialization phase, given the security parameters (κ, κ1), OC firstly chooses
three distinct larger primes (q1, p, q) randomly, where |q1| = κ and |p| = |q| = κ1. Then, OC
computes the RSA modulus n = pq, Carmichael’s function λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and chooses
a generator g ∈ Z∗n2 . OC also generates a cyclic group G with the prime order q1 and chooses
additional generators g0, u ∈ G. In addition, OC defines a function L(γ) = γ−1n , a cryptographic
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G and a pseudorandom function f : G × G → Z∗q1 . Assume that
the number of households in the RA is w. In the end, OC releases the system parameters as
Params={q1,G, g0, u,H, f, n, g, w},
and keeps the master key msk = (p, q, λ) privately.
4.3.2 User Registration
When a user of RA Ui joins the smart grid system, it firstly chooses a random number xi ∈ Z∗q1
as its private key and computes the corresponding public key as hi = gxi0 ∈ G. Then Ui picks




i . Finally, Ui sends
(hi,Hi) and its identifier IDi to the OC.
Upon receiving the registration message from a new user, OC chooses a random value ki ∈ G





i , where α is a secret and unique identifier for RA chosen by OC and distributed to
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all the households in the RA securely. At last, OC computes v0 = gα0 , stores (IDi, hi,Hi, ki, v0)
and returns (ei, e∗i ) to Ui.
With the secret key xi, Ui can securely receive the secret identifier ki and RA’s secret identifier
α by decrypting (ei, e∗i ) as ki||α = e∗i · (ei)−xi .
4.3.3 Report Generation
In order to achieve nearly real-time dispatch, a smart meter is deployed at the user’s side to
collect and report the electricity consumption every ρ minutes, e.g., ρ = 15 minutes. The smart
meter collects the usage data mi and performs the following steps to generate a consumption
report:
• Compute b′i = f(ki, t) and a′i = xi · (bi − b′i) + ai (mod q1), where t is the synchronized
system time period.
• Choose a random number si ∈ Z∗n2 and compute
ci = g
mi · sni mod n2.





• Send the consumption report Pi = IDi||a′i||ci||σi||t to the local GW in the RA.
4.3.4 Report Aggregation
Upon receiving total w individual consumption reports {P1, · · · , Pw} from the smart meters, the





i mod q1; c =
∏w




Then, GW forwards the aggregated usage report P = ID∗||a||c||σ||t to the OC, where ID∗
is the identifier of the local GW.
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4.3.5 Report Reading
After receiving P = ID∗||a||c||σ||t, OC performs the following steps to read the aggregated
report P :
• Use each user’s unique identifier ki to compute b∗i = f(ki, t) and then verify whether all









If it succeeds, continues to decrypt the ciphertext; Otherwise, aborts and outputs failure.










If yes, accepts m, which is the sum of the electricity consumption for the households in the
residential area; Otherwise, rejects m and outputs failure. If OC outputs failure in either of steps,
it retrieves all individual reports to find the corrupted reports utilizing a recursive divide-and-
conquer approach (binary search), as suggested by Ferrara et al. [74].
4.4 Security Analysis
This section will analyze the security properties of the proposed scheme. In particular, following
the security requirements described in section 4.2, we will focus on the authentication, confiden-
tiality and integrity.
• Authentication: In the new scheme, the trapdoor hash function is utilized to design the
effective interaction of the authentication process. Since the trapdoor hash function is secure
under the discrete logarithm assumption [72], the authenticity of the consumption reports can be
achieved. Specifically, an attacker can not find a collision (a′i, b
′







i hold without possessing the corresponding private key xi in polynomial time with non-
negligible success probability, unless the discrete logarithm problem is solvable. Therefore, the
attacker’s behaviors that aim at sending forged reports can be detected in the proposed scheme.
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• Confidentiality: In order to prevent the users’ electricity usage data from being revealed,
we employ the Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt the data and aggregate the ciphertexts based on
the property of the additive homomorphism. Since each ciphertext ci = gmi · sni mod n2 is
valid and Paillier cryptosystem is semantic secure against the chosen plaintext attack [34], the
confidentiality of the usage data mi can be protected. Although an attacker eavesdrops on the
communication channels, it is still unable to learn about the individual report mi. When the GW
receives all the reports from the residential users, it can not recover the reports but aggregating
the ciphertexts directly and forwarding them to the OC. Thus, the GW is unable to acquire any
information from both the separated reports and the aggregated one. At the OC’s side, it decrypts
the compressed report and obtains the sum of the power usage in a residential area rather than
individual data. Therefore, the confidentiality of the usage data entirely depends on the semantic
security of the Paillier encryption scheme, which can be reduced to the computational composite
residuosity assumption [34].
• Integrity: In the user registration, OC utilizes the Elgamal encryption to distribute α to all
the users in the residential area. Since the Elgamal encryption is semantic secure, only the users
in RA are able to recover α. So α can be viewed as a secret key shared among the users. Then we
should prove that the tags σi(1 ≤ i ≤ w) are existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen
message attack if the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds.
Theorem 1: The tags σi(1 ≤ i ≤ w) are existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen
message attack, provided that the CDH assumption holds.
Proof : Assume that there is an adversary A who can break the existential unforgeability of
the tags with a non-negligible advantage, then we can construct an algorithm B to solve the CDH
problem.
Let g0 be a generator of G. Algorithm B is given g0, gs0, h ∈ G, its goal is to compute hs. B
simulates a challenger and interacts with the adversary A as follows.
• In generating a key, B sets the public key v0 to gs0 and sends it to A.
• B programs the random oracle to respond the hash queries. To ensure the consistency of
the responses, it maintains a lists of tuples to keep the queries. When receiving queries
(IDi, t) from A, B chooses a random x ∈ Z∗q1 and returns g
x
0 .
• B also programs the tag oracle to respond the tag queries and a list of tuples are kept to




Assume (IDi, t, a′i,mi) is the tag query issued by A, B picks a random xi ∈ Z∗q1 and
programs the random oracle as
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• Eventually, A produces a tag σ on the data (ID, t, a,m). Assume that σ is a valid tag on
m under the given public key; Otherwise, B reports failure and aborts. So the response
satisfies the verification equation, i.e.,
ê(σ, g0) = ê(
∏w
i=1 H(ID||t) · ga0um, v0).
Let the expected tag, which would have been obtained from the honest signers, be σ′ on
the data (ID, t, a′,m′). The expected tag also satisfies the verification equation, i.e.,






If a = a′ andm = m′, then σ = σ′. Thus, if we define that ∆a = a−a′ and ∆m = m−m′,
there must be the case that at least one of ∆a and ∆m is nonzero.
– If σ 6= σ′, we divide the verification equation for σ by the equation for σ′ and obtain
ê( σ
σ′




Rearranging the equation yields
ê( σ
σ′
· v∆a+β∆m0 , g0) = ê(hγ∆m, v0).
Since v0 = gs0, we have





which is the solution to the CDH problem.
– Otherwise, we get ga0um = ga
′
0 u
m′ , and that
1 = g∆a+β∆m0 h
γ∆m.





Since the hardness of the CDH problem implies the hardness of the discrete logarithm
problem, the existential unforgeability can be reduced to the CDH problem.
In summary, the adversary, even the malicious GW, is not able to modify the electricity usage
reports when they are transmitted on the communication channels.
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme in terms of the computa-
tional performance and the communication overhead.
4.5.1 Computational Performance
When a residential user Ui registers for the smart grid system, it requires three exponentiation
operations in G to generate its public key and the trapdoor hash value. After receiving the regis-
tration message, OC needs three exponentiation operations in G to encrypt ki and α and calculate
v0. To decrypt the ciphertext, the Ui should perform one exponentiation operation in G. When
the users in the residential area generate the electricity consumption reports, two exponentiation
operations in Zn2 and 3 exponentiation operations in G are required for each smart meter. To
aggregate the reports, GW only needs to perform inexpensive multiplication operations to aggre-
gate the reports and forward the result to the OC. Before getting the sum of the consumption,
the OC verifies the validation of the aggregated tag, which needs to execute 2 exponentiation
operations in G and two pairing operations. Then, it performs w+1 exponentiation operations in
G and two exponentiation operations in Zn2 to check the collision of the trapdoor hash functions
and decrypt the aggregated ciphertext of the usage data.
We present the computational performance comparison of our security-enhanced data aggre-
gation (SEDA) scheme and three schemes, namely, EPPA (Lu et al. [10]), Ohara14 (ohara et
al. [39]) and Fan14 (Fan et al. [38]), which are designed from additive homomorphic encryption
schemes as well. The implementation is conducted on a notebook with Intel Core i5-4200U
CPU @1.6 GHz, 2.29GHz and the memory is 4.00 GB. We use the MIRACL library to imple-
ment number-theoretic based methods of cryptography. The RSA modulus n is approximately
1024 bits and the parameter q1 is 160 bits. The time costs of four algorithms are shown in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Time Costs (Unit:ms)
Matric SEDA EPPA [10] Fan14 [38] Ohara14 [39]
Rep. Gene. Time 23.7 26.2 7.3 96.2
Rep. Aggr. Time 5.3 4906.3 6737.6 4.1
Rep. Read. Time 421.8 97.7 890.5 943.1
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Figure 4.2: Computational overhead comparison
Fig. 4.2(a) shows the comparison results of four schemes on the aggregation computational
costs. From the figure, we can see that our scheme is much more efficient than Lu’s et al. EPPA
scheme [10] and Fan’s et al. scheme [38], since the time costs of the aggregation algorithms in
their schemes increase significantly as the number of users increases. Ohara’s et al. scheme [39]
costs less time than ours, but its report reading algorithm needs the longest time in four schemes.
Fig. 4.2(b) shows the comparison results in terms of report reading computational cost.
Among these schemes, Fan’s et al. scheme [38] and Ohara’s et al. scheme [39] cost plenty of
time to decrypt the aggregated report when the number of the users is large. Although Lu’s et
al. scheme [10] is slightly more efficient than our scheme in the report reading process, their
scheme poses a risk of report forging attack from malicious GW.
4.5.2 Communication Overhead
The communication of the scheme composes of user-to-GW communication and GW-to-OC
communication. In the user-to-GW communication, each user generates its electricity usage
data Pi = IDi||a′i||ci||σi||t and sends them to the GW, which is of binary length SUG =
|IDi| + 160 + 2048 + 1024 + |t|, if n is 1024 bits and q1 is 160 bits. So at the GW’s side,
the communication overhead between users and GW is w ∗ SUG, assume there are w users in a
specific residential area. In report aggregation process, the GW aggregates the reports to com-
pute P = ID∗||a||c||σ||t, indicating that the communication overhead between GW and OC is
significantly reduced. Specifically, the overhead of GW-to-OC communication decreases from
(|ID∗|+160+2048+1024+ |t|)∗w bits to SGO = |ID∗|+160+2048+1024+ |t| bits. Further-
more, we plot the communication overheads of three schemes with respect to the users’ number
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w. Since Fan et al. [38] do not consider the communication between GW and OC, we only show
the overhead from three schemes in Fig. 4.3. It can be seen that Ohara’s et al. scheme [39]
causes the heaviest burden on the channel and the communication overhead of our scheme is
almost equivalent to that of Lu’s et al. scheme [10].
























































Figure 4.3: Communication overhead comparison
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient and secure data aggregation scheme for achieving
the real-time electrical measurements collection for smart grid communications based on trap-
door hash functions, Paillier cryptosystem and homomorphic authenticators that can resist the
attacks from malicious gateways. We have also provided security analysis to demonstrate secu-
rity strength and privacy-preserving capacity. Compared with existing data aggregation schemes
for smart gird, our scheme has lighter the computational overhead and lower the communication
cost. For our future work, we will study the methods to design the data aggregation schemes that
are able to detect and trace the misbehaviors of legal users.
58
Chapter 5
A Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing
Framework for Smart Grid
Distributed energy resources, featured with small-scale power generation technologies and re-
newable energy sources, are considered as necessary supplements for smart grid. To ensure that
merged resources contribute effectively to the grid, data generated by consumer side should be
shared among the energy resources. However, it also introduces challenges of the protection of
consumer privacy. To address these difficulties, in this chapter we propose a new framework
to share data in smart grid by leveraging new advances in homomorphic encryption and proxy
re-encryption. Our proposed framework allows energy resources to analyze consumer data while
ensuring consumer privacy. An additional benefit of our proposed framework is that consumer
data is transmitted over the smart grid only once. Furthermore, we present a concrete scheme
falling into the proposed framework. Extensive analysis shows that the concrete scheme is secure
and efficient.
5.1 Introduction
There have been several instances when power grids across the globe risked catastrophic failure
[2]. Oftentimes, power outages are caused by localized defects in the electricity networks. If a
small defect is not dealt in a proper and timely manner, it could lead to a cascading failure of
the power supply network. For example, a power outage on the east coast of the United States
and Canada in 2003 was such a case. A power line was damaged by a tree in the Cleveland,
USA. Making matters worse is that nearby lines became overloaded and overheated by rerouted
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power and sagged from the excessive heat. This eventually tripped circuit breakers after these
lines contacted trees. Approximately 50 million people in the Northeast US and part of Canada
were left without power for several days [5]. Power outages can also be caused by overloaded
electrical circuits. Electricity consumption is higher during hotter summer days. In some cases
electrical demands may exceed power grid capacity. In such cases appliances should be turned
off to conserve energy or additional resources should be added to grid to compensate demands. If
left unaddressed, an overloaded power grid could fail, resulting in blackouts. It is thus crucial that
we monitor power grid systems in real-time to ensure that abnormalities are dealt with promptly
and effectively.
Figure 5.1: Communication architecture for smart grid
Smart grids have recently been gaining popularity. They support real-time diagnosis and can
react to avoid failures and blackouts [10, 37, 68, 75, 76]. The major difference between the smart
and traditional power grids is information flows. In the traditional power grid, there exists only
one-way electrical flows, i.e., electricity utilities only deliver power to consumers. In contrast,
smart grids allow for two-way information flow communications. As shown in Fig. 5.1, the two-
way information flows in the smart grid are almost parallel to that of the one-way power flows.
However, a control center is also involved in information flows. A control center collects data
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with which it can decide on how to alter a grid. With electricity consumption reports a control
center can analyze consumers electricity consumption data and forecast electricity consumption,
and adjust power generation accordingly over a given period. Regular electricity consumption
reports are key in smart grid efficacy.
On the other hand, the collected electricity consumption reports should be secured to preserve
consumer privacy [15, 37]. To operate reliable and resilient smart grids it is paramount that we
address security and privacy concerns through established cryptographic schemes. Traditional
encryption schemes are quite suitable for single energy source configurations. In these cases,
a single control center, often controlled by a government or government affiliated party can be
counted on as a trusted confidant. This can become troublesome for more complex arrays where
supplemental sources from small-scale generation and renewable energy projects come into play
[18, 19]. Such grids are referred to as “micro-grids”. Not all the distributed energy resources are
under direct government control. Therefore, trusting these entities is questionable. A dilemma
of balancing between consumer privacy and enabling energy resources to freely analyze records
becomes apparent.
A trivial solution is to anonymize data before sending it to energy resources for analysis.
However, it would significantly increase the communication costs; massive anonymized data
needs to be sent to every resource. An alternative is to let some third party perform analysis
instead of energy resources. Only analysis results are sent to energy resources. Nevertheless,
the third party would be privy to analysis results. This is undesirable by competing businesses
and privacy advocates. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient approach so far to this
problem in the context of privacy-preserving smart grid. In this chapter, we aim to address the
above challenge and propose a framework for data sharing in smart grid. The contributions of
this chapter are twofold.
• First, we propose a novel data sharing framework for smart grid, where we combine the
two popular infrastructures: the smart grid and cloud computing. In particular, we al-
low the electricity consumption reports generated in smart grid to be stored in the cloud.
Distributed energy resources can obtain the statistics and analysis results from the cloud
computing. Hence, our proposed framework can take advantage of cloud computing for
the smart grid.
• Second, our proposed framework makes use of the homomorphic encryption technique to
facilitate the statistics and analysis on the encrypted electricity consumption reports, and
the proxy re-encryption technique to keep the statistics and analysis results secret from the
cloud.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we present the system
model, security model, and the design goal. Then, we propose the data sharing framework in
Section 5.3, followed by security analysis and performance evaluation in Section 5.4. Finally,
we draw our conclusion in Section 5.5.
5.2 Models and Design Goals
In this section, we present the system model, security model, and design goals.
5.2.1 System Model
In this chapter, we only focus on how the electricity consumption reports are securely shared
among the distributed generation resources. In particular, we take advantage of the data-as-
a-service (DaaS) model in cloud computing, where the system is composed of the following
parties: the trusted authority (TA), many electricity consumers (ECs), many energy resources
(ERs) and the cloud server as shown in Fig. 5.2. The TA is responsible for generating the system
parameters and the certificate for the public key of each ER. The ECs produce the electricity
consumption reports that are outsourced to the cloud server. To achieve the confidentiality, the
electricity consumption reports should be encrypted by using the public key of the corresponding
ER where the consumed electricity comes from. In order to make a smart decision on the power
generation, price and others, each ER would like to do analysis on the electricity consumption
reports corresponding to itself or other ERs. Before doing the analysis, the ER should obtain the
analysis rights from other ERs.
5.2.2 Security Model
We assume that the cloud server is honest-but-curious as many literatures related to cloud com-
puting [44–46]. That is to say, the cloud server will follow the proposed framework faithfully,
but could launch passive attacks to get secret information as much as possible. In particular,
the cloud server is interested in getting the content of electricity consumption reports or analysis
results, but they won’t modify the communication data with other entities or collude with other
entities. The ERs want to get the analysis results from the cloud server so that they can plan more
effectively and efficiently to produce an adequate supply of electricity to serve their local needs.
It plays an important role in making our power grid more reliable and resilient since we must












Figure 5.2: The proposed data sharing framework for smart grid
and blackout. Meanwhile, malicious ERs may try to access electricity consumption reports or
get the analysis results beyond their analysis rights.
5.2.3 Design Goals
Our design goal is to develop a data sharing framework for smart grid. It has the following
desirable properties.
• First, we propose a novel data sharing framework for smart grid, where we combine the
two popular infrastructures: the smart grid and cloud computing. In particular, we allow
the electricity consumption reports generated in smart grid to be stored in the cloud, and
the distributed energy resources can obtain the statistics and analysis results from the cloud
computing. Hence, our proposed framework can take advantage of cloud computing for
smart grid.
• Second, our proposed framework makes use of the homomorphic encryption technique to
facilitate the statistics and analysis on the encrypted electricity consumption reports, and
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the proxy re-encryption technique to keep the statistics and analysis results secret from the
cloud.
• DaaS model: The proposed framework takes advantage of the DaaS model in cloud com-
puting, which can save a good amount of hardware and software maintenance cost for
smart grid. Furthermore, the electricity consumption reports do not need to transmit over
the network after the analysis request from the ER, which saves the communication cost in
smart grid.
• Privacy preservation: The proposed framework should achieve privacy requirements of
ECs. In particular, i) the electricity consumption reports stored in the cloud server cannot
be revealed to anyone except the corresponding ER; and ii) the analysis results cannot be
revealed to the one who has no corresponding analysis rights.
5.3 Proposed Data Sharing Framework
In this section, we present our data sharing framework, which consists of four parts: system ini-
tialization, reports creation, analysis grant, and reports analysis. Before plugging into the frame-
work detail, we first need to review the preliminaries, including Bilinear groups, homomorphic
encryption and proxy re-encryption, which will serve as the basis of our proposed framework.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
1) Bilinear Groups
Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q. They are equipped with an
admissible bilinear map e : G×G→ GT , such that e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab for all a, b ∈ Zq and
any g1, g2 ∈ G. We denote BSetup as an algorithm that, on the input of security parameter λ,
outputs the parameters (G,GT , q, g, e), where q ∈ Θ(2λ).
2) Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption [78] is a special form of encryption that allows anyone with cipher-
texts of messages (m1, · · · ,mt) to output a ciphertext of message f(m1, · · · ,mt) for some de-
sired function f without knowing the decryption key. If the function f could be any function,
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then the homomorphic encryption is a fully homomorphic encryption. A concrete homomorphic
encryption scheme is composed of the following four algorithms.
• HE.KeyGen: The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes a security
parameter λ as input, and outputs the public/private key pair (pk, sk).
• HE.Enc: The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes public key pk and
a message m from the message spaceM as input, and outputs the ciphertext c.
• HE.Dec: The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes the private key sk
and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs the corresponding message m.
• HE.Eva: The evaluation algorithm is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that takes the pub-
lic key pk, a set of ciphertexts on messages (m1, · · · ,mt), and a evaluation function f as
input, and outputs the ciphertext c on f(m1, · · · ,mt).
The correctness of a homomorphic encryption scheme should satisfy the following two re-
quirements for HE.KeyGen(λ)→ (pk, sk).
HE.Dec(sk, HE.Enc(pk,m)) = m, and
HE.Dec(sk, HE.Eva(pk, {HE.Enc(pk,mi)}ti=1, f)) = f(m1, · · · ,mt).
3) Proxy Re-encryption
Proxy re-encryption [79] is a special kind of public key encryption, which allows a semi-trusted
proxy with some information to transform a ciphertext under one public key into another cipher-
text under another public key. However, the corresponding message cannot be revealed during
the transformation process. A concrete proxy re-encryption scheme is composed of the following
five algorithms.
• PRE.KeyGen: The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes a security
parameter λ as input, and outputs the public/private key pair (pk, sk).
• PRE.Enc: The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes public key pk and
a message m from the message spaceM as input, and outputs the ciphertext c.
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• PRE.Dec: The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes the private key
sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs the corresponding message m.
• PRE.ReKey: The re-encryption key algorithm is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that
takes one public/private key pair (pk1, sk1) and another public key pk2 as input, and outputs
the corresponding re-encryption key rk.
• PRE.ReEnc: The re-encryption algorithm is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that takes
a ciphertext c1 under public key pk1, and a re-encryption key rk corresponding to the
delegation from pk1 to pk2 as input, and outputs the ciphertext c2 under public key pk2.
The correctness of a proxy re-encryption scheme should satisfy the following two require-
ments for any PRE.KeyGen(λ)→ (pk, sk).
PRE.Dec(sk, PRE.Enc(pk,m)) = m, and
PRE.Dec(sk2, PRE.ReEnc(PRE.ReKey(pk1, sk1, pk2), c1)) = m,
where c1 is the ciphertext corresponding tom under public key pk1, which can be from algorithm
PRE.Enc or algorithm PRE.ReEnc.
5.3.2 Main Idea
In order to protect consumers’ privacy in the electricity consumption reports, these reports should
be encrypted before uploading to the cloud server under the corresponding ER’s public key. To
respond an analysis request from an ER, the cloud server does the following steps.
• First, the cloud server makes use of homomorphic encryption technique to do the statistics
and analysis on the electricity consumption reports encrypted under the same ER’s public
key without revealing the content of the electricity consumption reports or the obtained
analysis result. We call the obtained analysis result as meta-result.
• Second, the cloud server takes advantage of proxy re-encryption technique to transform the
meta-result encrypted under other ER’s public key to the one encrypted under the public
key of the requesting ER without revealing the content of the meta-result.
• Third, the cloud server makes use of homomorphic encryption technique once more. In
particular, it does the statistics and analysis on the meta-result under the public key of the
requesting ER without revealing the content of the meta-result or the final analysis result.
It is easy to see that the requesting ER can obtain the content of the final analysis result by
using its own private key.
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From the above steps, we can see that only the encrypted final analysis is required to be sent from
the cloud server to the requesting ER. This method allows the smart grid to save the network
bandwidth as opposed to sending the anonymized report to each distributed energy resource,
which is widely used in practice today.
5.3.3 Description of the Proposed Framework
In this subsection, we will give our framework for the smart grid based on the homomorphic
encryption and proxy re-encryption. Note that we require the key space and ciphertext space of
the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme and proxy re-encryption scheme be the same;
otherwise, the proposal cannot work well.
1) System Initialization
In this phase, the TA generates the system parameters, including the security parameter λ, the ER
generates its own public/private key pair (pk, sk) by running PRE.KeyGen(λ), and the public key
pk is implemented in the device (such as smart meter) of the EC who will consume the electricity
generated by the ER. Furthermore, each ER should obtain the certificate cert for its public key
from the TA.
2) Reports Creation
Before uploading the electricity consumption reports to the cloud server, the consumer encrypts
the electricity consumption reports m by running PRE.Enc(pk,m) → c, where pk is the public
key of the corresponding ER. The encrypted reports are stored on the cloud server in the format
as shown in Fig. 5.3, where ID contains the necessary information to identify the reports, such
as address and the ER’s identity information.
ID HE.Enc(pk,m)
Figure 5.3: Format of an encrypted report stored on the cloud server
3) Analysis Grant
In this phase, the requesting ER (denoted as A) will obtain the analysis rights from other ERs
(denoted as {B1, · · · , Bn}, where n is a positive integer). Besides these entities, the cloud server
will also be involved in this phase. ER A will interact with each ER in {B1, · · · , Bn} as follows.
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• ERA sends the request containing ID and evaluation function f to ERBi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}),
where ID shows the range of reports it wants to analyze, and the certificate of ERA’s pub-
lic key.
• ER Bi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) first checks the validity of the certificate of ER A’s public key.
If no, ER Bi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) aborts this phase; otherwise, it then decides whether ER A
could have the analysis rights on the reports corresponding to ID by using the evaluation
function f . If yes, ERBi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) generates the re-encryption key rki correspond-
ing to (pkBi , pkA) by running PRE.ReKey(pkBi , skBi , pkA), and sends (rki, pkBi , pkA) to
the cloud server via a secure and authenticated channel. Note that pkBi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n})
and pkA are the public keys of ER A and ER Bi respectively.
• Upon receiving (rki, pkBi , pkA) from ER Bi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}), the cloud server records the
values with an encryption format in the re-encryption key list.
4) Reports Analysis
In this phase, the ERA obtains the statistics and analysis results from the cloud server as follows.
• The ER A sends its certificate cert, ID, f and {B1, · · · , Bn} to the cloud server via an
authenticated channel. In the following steps, we implicitly set i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
• Upon receiving the information from the ER, the cloud server checks the validity. If it is
valid, the cloud server does the next step; otherwise, it aborts this phase.
• The cloud server collects the ciphertext set Ci corresponding to ID and Bi, and computes
the encrypted meta-results cB,i by running HE.Eva(pkBi , Ci, f).
• The cloud server finds the re-encryption key rki corresponding to pkBi and pkA from the
re-encryption key list.
• The cloud server transforms the ciphertext cB,i under public key pkBi into another cipher-
text cA,i under public key pkA by running PRE.ReEnc(rki, cB,i).
• The cloud server computes the encrypted final analysis ĉ by running
HE.Eva(pkA, {cA,1, cA,2, · · · , cA,n}, f).
• At last, the ER A can obtain the final analysis result from ĉ by running PRE.Dec(skA, ĉ).
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5) Discussion on the Proposed Framework
As we mentioned before, we require the key space and ciphertext space of the underlying ho-
momorphic encryption scheme and proxy re-encryption scheme be the same; otherwise, the pro-
posal cannot work. However, none of the existing homomorphic encryption schemes or proxy re-
encryption schemes satisfy the above two conditions naturally. In this subsection, we show that
homomorphic encryption schemes can be transformed to the satisfied one by an example using
ElGamal-type encryption that only supports multiplicative homomorphism. This ElGamal-type
encryption scheme can be found in [55].
The system parameters are (G,GT , q, g1, g2)← BSetup(1λ).
• HE.KeyGen (PRE.KeyGen): Randomly choose x from Zq, and set the key pair as (pk, sk) =
((pk1 = e(g1, g2)
x, pk2 = g
1/x
2 ), x).
• HE.Enc (PRE.Enc): When inputting a messagem from GT and a public key pk = (pk1, pk2),
it outputs the ciphertext c = (c1, c2) as follows.
c1 = g
r
1, c2 = pk
r
1 ·m = e(g1, g2)x·r ·m
where r is a random element from Zq.
• PRE.ReKey: When inputting one key pair





2 as the corresponding re-encryption key.
• PRE.ReEnc: When inputting a ciphertext cA = (cA,1, cA,2) = (gr, pkrA,1 · m) and rk =
g
xA/xB
2 corresponding to the delegation from pkA to pkB, it outputs the re-encrypted ci-
phertext cB = (cB,1, cB,2), where










α is a random element from Zq, and r̂ = r · xA/xB + α mod q.
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• HE.Eva: When inputting two ciphertexts c and c′, it outputs evaluated ciphertext ĉ as fol-
lows.




1 · m′), the evaluated
ciphertext ĉ = (ĉ1, ĉ2) is as follows.





ĉ2 = c2 · c′2 · pkα1 = pkr+r
′+α
1 ·m1 ·m2 = pkr̂1 ·m1 ·m2,
where α is a random element from Zq, and r̂ = r + r′ + α mod q.





evaluated ciphertext ĉ = (ĉ1, ĉ2) is as follows.
ĉ1 = c1 · c′1 · gα1 = e(g1, g2)r+r
′+α = e(g1, g2)
r̂,
ĉ2 = c2 · c′2 · pkα1 = pkr+r
′+α
1 ·m1 ·m2 = pkr̂1 ·m1 ·m2,
where α is a random element from Zq, and r̂ = r + r′ + α mod q.
• PRE.Dec: When inputting a ciphertext c under pk and a private key sk, it outputs m as
follows.
– If c = (c1, c2) = (gr1, pkr1 ·m), the message m is computed as m = c2/e(c1, g2)sk =
(e(g1, g2)
sk)r ·m/e(gr1, g2)sk.
– If c = (c1, c2) = (e(g1, g2)r, pkr1 ·m), the message m is computed as m = c2/csk1 =
(e(g1, g2)
sk)r ·m/(e(g1, g2)r)sk.
Note that we do not need the algorithm HE.Dec or PRE.Dec with the case of c = (c1, c2) =
(gr1, pk
r
1 ·m) in our framework, since the ER always do the decryption on the ciphertext with the
format c = (c1, c2) = (e(g1, g2)r, pkr1 ·m).
As we can see that there are two kinds of ciphertexts in the above scheme. One is the ci-
phertexts can be re-encrypted, the other is the ciphertexts cannot be re-encrypted any more. We
respectively name them as the original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts. Hence, we have
two theorems for the security of the above scheme.
Theorem 1. The above scheme is chosen plaintext secure under the eDBDH assumption for the
original ciphertext. The eDBDH assumption assumes that given (g, gb/a, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G and T ∈
GT , it is hard for any polynomial probabilistic time adversary to decide whether T = e(g, g)abc
holds or not.
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Proof. We use the following two games played between an adversary A and a challenger C to
prove this theorem.
Game 0: This game models the original chosen plaintext attacks on the above scheme.
• Phase 1: In this phase, A can adaptively issue the following queries to the challenger C.
– Public key oracleOpk: When inputting an index i byA, C runs HE.KeyGen(1λ) to ob-
tain (pki, ski), and returns pki to A but keeps ski secret. At last, C records (pki, ski)
into List Lk.
– Private key oracleOsk: When inputting a public key pki from List Lk byA, C returns
the corresponding ski to A.
– Re-encryption key generation oracle Ork: When inputting two public keys (pki, pkj)
from List Lk by A, C returns the corresponding rkij to A.
• Challenge Phase: At some point, A decides to finish Phase 1, then it sends C two same
length messages m0,m1 from GT and a public key pk∗. There exist three restrictions
on pk∗. 1) pk∗ has never been queried to Osk; 2) if (pk∗, pk) has been queried to Ork,
pk cannot be queried to Osk; and 3) if pk has been queried to Osk, (pk∗, pk) cannot be
queried to Ork. C returns HE.Enc(pk∗,mb) to A as the challenge ciphertext c∗, where b is
a random bit.
• Phase 2: It is almost the same as that in Phase 1, except the following restrictions.
– Private key oracle Osk: 1) pk∗ cannot be queried to this oracle; 2) if (pk∗, pk) has
been queried to Ork, pk cannot be queried to Osk; and 3) if (pk∗, c∗, pk) has been
queried to Ore, pk cannot be queried to Osk.
– Re-encryption key generation oracle Ork: If pk has been queried to Osk, (pk∗, pk)
cannot be queried to Ork.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ on b. If b′ = b, then A wins the game.
If the probability of |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| is negligible, then the above scheme is chosen plaintext
secure for the original ciphertext.
Game 1: In this game, we will modify Game 0 as follows. Given the input of eDBDH problem
(g, gb/a, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G and T ∈ GT , C sets g1 = g and g2 = gb.
• Phase 1: In this phase, A can adaptively issue the following queries to the challenger C.
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– Public key oracle Opk: When inputting an index i by A, C decides the value of
θi ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[θi = 1] = δ, and chooses a random xi from Zq. If θi = 1, C
sets pki = (pki,1, pki,2) = (e(g1, g2)xi , g
1/xi
2 ). If θi = 0, C sets pki = (pki,1, pki,2) =
(e(ga, g2)
xi , (gb/a)1/xi). At last, C records (pki, xi, θi) into List Lk.
– Private key oracle Osk: When inputting a public key pki from List Lk by A, C
searches (pki, xi, θi) in List Lk. If θi = 1, C returns xi to A; otherwise, it outputs
failure.
– Re-encryption key generation oracle Ork: When inputting two public keys (pki, pkj)
from List Lk by A, C searches (pki, xi, θi) and (pkj, xj, θj) in List Lk.
∗ If θi = θj , C returns rkij = g
xi/xj
2 .
∗ If θi = 1 and θj = 0, C returns rkij = pk
xi/xj
j,2 .
∗ If θi = 0 and θj = 1, C outputs failure.
• Challenge Phase: After receiving m0,m1, pk∗ from A, C searches (pk∗, x∗, θ∗) List Lk. If
θ∗ = 1, C outputs failure; otherwise, it outputs the challenge ciphertext c∗ as follows.
c∗1 = g
c, c∗2 = T
x∗ ·mb.




∗ ·m = pk∗1c ·mb.
• Phase 2: It is almost the same as that in Phase 1 but with the restrictions as that in Game 0.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ on b. If b′ = b, then A wins the game.
If C does not output failure in Game 1, the probability of |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2| is not larger than
the probability of solving the eDBDH problem. This probability could be obtained as follows.
Suppose A makes a total of qsk private key queries and qrk re-encryption generation queries.
Then the probability that C does not output failure in phases 1 or 2 is δqsk · (1 − δ · (1 −
δ))qrk ≥ δqsk+2qrk . The probability that C does not output failure during the challenge phase
is (1− δ). Therefore, the probability that C does not output failure in Game 1 is no less than
δqsk+2qrk(1 − δ). This value is maximized at θopt = 1 − 1/(qsk + 2qrk + 1). As a result, the
probability that C does not output failure in Game 1 is no less than 1/e(qsk + 2qrk + 1).
Theorem 2. The above scheme is chosen plaintext secure under the eDDH assumption for
the re-encrypted ciphertext. The eDDH assumption assumes that given (g, g1/a, ga) ∈ G and
(e(g, g)b, T ) ∈ GT , it is hard for any polynomial probabilistic time adversary to decide whether
T = e(g, g)ab holds or not.
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Proof. As that in the proof of Theorem 1, we use two games played between an adversaryA and
a challenger C to prove this theorem.
Game 0: This game models the original chosen plaintext attacks on the above scheme.
• Phase 1: Identical to that in the proof of Theorem 1.
• Challenge Phase: At some point, A decides to finish Phase 1, then it sends C two same
length messages m0,m1 from GT and two public keys pk, pk∗. There exists only one
restriction on pk∗, i.e., pk∗ has never been queried to Osk. C returns
PRE.ReEnc(PRE.ReKey(pk, sk, pk∗) and HE.Enc(pk,mb) to A as the challenge ciphertext
c∗, where sk is the private key corresponding to pk, and b is a random bit.
• Phase 2: It is almost the same as that in Phase 1, except the following restrictions.
– Private key oracle Osk: pk∗ cannot be queried to this oracle.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ on b. If b′ = b, then A wins the game.
If the probability of |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| is negligible, then the above scheme is chosen plaintext
secure for the re-encrypted ciphertext.
Game 1: In this game, we will modify Game 0 as follows. Given the input of eDDH problem
(g, g1/a, ga, ) ∈ G and (e(g, g)b, T ) ∈ GT , C sets g1 = g and g2 = gw, where w is a random
element from Zq.
• Phase 1: In this phase, A can adaptively issue the following queries to the challenger C.
– Public key oracle Opk: When inputting an index i by A, C decides the value of
θi ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[θi = 1] = δ, and chooses a random xi from Zq. If θi = 1, C
sets pki = (pki,1, pki,2) = (e(g1, g2)xi , g
1/xi
2 ). If θi = 0, C sets pki = (pki,1, pki,2) =
(e(ga, g2)
xi , (gw/a)1/xi). At last, C records (pki, xi, θi) into List Lk.
– Private key oracle Osk: When inputting a public key pki from List Lk by A, C
searches (pki, xi, θi) in List Lk. If θi = 1, C returns xi to A; otherwise, it outputs
failure.
– Re-encryption key generation oracle Ork: When inputting two public keys (pki, pkj)
from List Lk by A, C searches (pki, xi, θi) and (pkj, xj, θj) in List Lk.
∗ If θi = θj , C returns rkij = g
xi/xj
2 .




∗ If θi = 0 and θj = 1, C returns rkij = (ga)w·xi/xj .
• Challenge Phase: After receiving m0,m1, pk∗ from A, C searches (pk∗, x∗, θ∗) List Lk. If
θ∗ = 1, C outputs failure; otherwise, it outputs the challenge ciphertext c∗ as follows.
c∗1 = e(g, g)
b, c∗2 = T
w·x∗ ·mb.




∗ ·m = pk∗1c ·mb.
• Phase 2: It is almost the same as that in Phase 1 but with the restrictions as that in Game 0.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ on b. If b′ = b, then A wins the game.
If C does not output failure in Game 1, the probability of |Pr[b′ = b] − 1/2| is not larger
than the probability of solving the eDDH problem. This probability could be obtained as follows.
Suppose A makes a total of qsk private key queries. Then the probability that C does not output
failure in phases 1 or 2 is δqsk . The probability that C does not output failure during the
challenge phase is (1− δ). Therefore, the probability that C does not output failure in Game
1 is δqsk(1 − δ). This value is maximized at θopt = 1 − 1/(qsk + 1). As a result, the probability
that C does not output failure in Game 1 is no less than 1/e(qsk + 1).
5.4 Analysis
In this section, we give the security analysis and performance analysis of the proposed frame.
5.4.1 Security Analysis
In the proposed framework, the reports are encrypted by the homomorphic encryption. Hence,
only if the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme is secure, the consumer’s privacy in the
reports can be guaranteed. On the other hand, the statistics and analysis results are encrypted by
the proxy re-encryption. Hence, only if the underlying proxy re-encryption scheme is secure, the
confidentiality of the results can be guaranteed.
5.4.2 Performance Analysis
In our framework, the TA only needs to generate a certificate for each ER, and the communication
cost is only related to this type of data. The cloud server needs to verify the certificate, and run
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Table 5.1: The experimental results of the proposed scheme
Algorithm Time Cost
in theory in simulation (ms)
HE.KeyGen (PRE.KeyGen) 1Te,G + 1Te,GT 53.69
HE.Enc (PRE.Enc) 1Te,G + 1Te,GT + 1Tm,GT 53.75
PRE.ReKey 1Te,G 45.95
PRE.ReEnc 1Tp + 2Te,GT + 2Tm,GT 66.99
HE.Eva
orig. ciphertext 1Te,G + 1Te,GT +
(n − 1)(Tm,G +
Tm,GT )
See Fig. 5.4
re-encr. ciphertext 2Te,GT + 2(n− 1)Tm,GT
PRE.Dec
orig. ciphertext 1Tp + 1Te,GT + 1Tm,GT 59.18
re-encr. ciphertext 1Te,GT + 1Tm,GT 7.82
algorithms HE.Eva and PRE.ReEnc for every query from the ER, and the communication cost
is related to these three types of data. As for the consumer side, the computation cost and
communication cost is quite simple, and it is only related to HE.Enc. Regarding the ER side, the
computation cost is mainly related to PRE.ReEnc and PRE.Dec.
As shown above, the performance of our proposed framework is mainly up to the under-
lying homomorphic encryption scheme and proxy re-encryption scheme. While the proposed
framework itself is quite simple and easy to analyze.
Moreover, we implement the proposed scheme in Section 5.3.3 by using the Pairing-based
Cryptography Library [80], where the parameter is the type A curve. The underlying proces-
sor is Pentium (R) Dula-Core CPU T4300 @ 2.10GHz 2.09GHz, and the operating system is
Windows 7 Professional with Service Pack 1. The experimental results can be found in Table
5.1 and Fig.5.4. In Table 5.1, we denote Te,G, Tm,G, Te,GT , Tm,GT , and Tp as the timing of an
exponentiation and a multiplication in G, an exponentiation and a multiplication in GT , and a
pairing, respectively. The time cost of HE.Eva is related to the number of ciphertexts n, and Fig.


























Figure 5.4: The experimental results of algorithm HE.Eva
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed a data sharing framework for smart grid. The proposed frame-
work mainly studies how to keep smart grid still smart in the sense that electricity consumption
reports can be analyzed by distributed energy resources, while the consumer privacy in the re-
ports can still be protected. We also presented a concrete scheme (supporting multiplication
homomorphism) falling into the proposed framework. Extensive analysis shows that the con-
crete scheme is secure and efficient. In the future work, we plan to design a concrete scheme
supporting our requirements for the proposed framework and full homomorphism.
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Chapter 6
Efficient and Privacy-preserving Smart
Grid Downlink Communication Using
Identity Based Signcryption
In this chapter, we propose an efficient and privacy-preserving scheme for smart grid down-
link communication. Specifically, we propose an efficient identity based signcryption, called
EIBSC, providing privacy preservation in downlink communication for smart grids. The pro-
posed scheme is characterized by employing the concealing destination technique on the tree-
based network to protect consumer privacy in downlink communication. Moreover, the proposed
scheme employs identity based signcryption to efficiently achieve downlink message source au-
thentication, data integrity and encryption. Additionally, compared to other identity-based sign-
cryption schemes, the proposed scheme is more efficient in regards to computational overhead
and ciphertext size. Furthermore, our security analysis illustrates that the proposed scheme is
resilient against various security threats to smart grids.
6.1 Introduction
Smart grids are a combination of the electrical grid and power infrastructure together supple-
mented by information and communication technology (ICT). The smart grid has introduced
several advantageous components over their traditional counterparts. One being the presence
of smart meters, a significant part of modern day electrical infrastructure. They are installed at
customer houses and are capable of computing and communicating with control centers (i.e.,
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the utility companies). These smart meters can be wired or wirelessly connected to electrical
appliances in consumer homes and are capable ccommunicating with other intuitive smart grid
components such as gateways. This is beneficial not only to consumers but distributed energy
resources/suppliers as well. Smart grids allow utility companies to monitor power generation,
transmission, delivery and power consumption in real time. However, remotely control and use
management rely on collecting data from smart grids, especially from smart meters in uplink and
downlink transmissions.
In uplink transmissions, collected data is sent from smart meters to utility companies or to
utility components like gateways. On the other hand, downlink transmissions control messages
are sent from utility companies to smart meters, groups of smart meters or to compatible electri-
cal devices on smart grids. These messages are intended to remotely control smart meters and
enable a number of features which include device shut down, monitoring statuses and aggrega-
tion of power usage. Aggregated data and control messages are subject to several security and
privacy concerns. Aggregated data may be manipulated and malicious entities can abuse broad-
cast messages to cause power outages for households and neighborhoods. Currently, a number
of smart grids struggle against attackers for the control of key infrastructure. In 2015 Ukraine
experienced an attack resulting in complete power outages for 103 cities and partial outages in
186 [81].
Security and privacy are of paramount importance in smart grid for both suppliers and con-
sumers. Consumers privacy is a primary concern for customers, power consumption records may
disclose household activities, occupancy and the variety of appliances in a house. For example,
low power consumption is an indicator that home owners are possibly away. Additionally, power
signatures can be analyzed to detect appliance types. Leaked utility information can be quite
profitable for marketing. A number of consumers are engaged in industrial or manufacturing
work. It is in the interest of both public and private parties to ensure privacy. This includes
safeguarding against leakages and cyberattacks.
There has been extensive research concerning privacy and security on the smart grid. Much
literature have proposed schemes to address confidentiality, data integrity and authenticity in
uplink transmissions [8, 10, 22, 52, 53, 82, 83]. However, only few security schemes have been
proposed to secure downlink communications in smart grid. Moreover, these schemes have
been suggested to tackle security goals separately. More precisely, their focuses are only on
either data integrity and authenticity or confidentiality. Of course, in smart grids a scheme that
provides authenticity or/and data integrity does not necessarily provide confidentiality as well.
For example, if the utility company wants to send a command to shut down, it can implement
a digital signature scheme to prevent malicious users from issuing such a commands against
consumers on the smart grid [84, 85].
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On the other hand, consumers on the smart grid would like their privacy safeguarded not only
in uplink transmission, but in the downlink communications as well. This would prevent unau-
thorized consumers from guessing to whom a command was issued to. In this case, an adversary
or even a legitimate user may discern the destination in a residential area network to which a shut-
down command was issued. As a result of this, consumers will lose sensitive information during
the downlink communication. Therefore, there is an urgent need for authenticity-confidentiality
schemes in the smart grid to efficiently achieve both authenticity and confidentiality.
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that simultaneously performs both encryption and
digital signing on a message. Signcryption schemes are constructed to be more efficient than
combining two separate schemes for encryption and signing. Additionally, Signcryption is in-
tended to provide essential security services as well as reduce computational cost and communi-
cation overhead.
In this chapter, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving scheme for smart gird downlink
communication using identity based signcryption. The proposed scheme, called EIBSC, provides
consumer privacy and authenticity as well as data integrity in downlink communication while
saving computational cost and communication overhead. The proposed scheme is characterized
by employing concealing technique to provide consumer privacy. Concretely, each residential
consumer has a smart meter connected to smart appliances forming House Area Networks. Smart
meters in residential areas can be connected via a gateway, which acts as an intermediate point
between smart meters, and a control center in utility companies. With our proposed scheme,
control and command messages can be securely and efficiently transmitted from the control
center to smart meter(s). Specifically, the contributions of this chapter are:
• We propose an identity-based signcryption scheme implemented concealing technique for
downlink communication in smart gird in order to protect consumer privacy, authenticity
and data integrity.
• The proposed scheme is based on a tree-based network in which downlink communication
can be more efficient using minimum spanning trees and privacy preservation is provided
using the concealing destination technique.
• The proposed scheme is much more efficient in terms of computational costs and ci-
phertext size compared to other signcryption schemes and outperforms existing competing
schemes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the system
model, residential tree-based network construction, security requirements and design goal. In
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Section 6.3, we recall the bilinear pairing. Then, we present our EIBSC scheme in Section 6.4,
followed by its security analysis and performance evaluation in Section 6.5 and Section 6.6,
respectively. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section 6.7.
6.2 System Model And Design Goals
In this section, we formalize the system requirements, residential tree-based network construc-
tion, security requirements, and identify our design goals.
6.2.1 System Model
In our system model, we consider a typical Residential Tree-based Network (RTN) consists of
smart meter devices in a smart grid system. Smart grid systems consist of a control center, a RTN
gateway (R-Gateway), and a number of smart meters (SMs) SM1, SM2, · · · , as shown in Fig.
6.1.
• Control Center (CC): Control center is a trusted entity whose responsibilities include ini-
tializing a system, collecting uplink transmissions from smart meters, real-time monitoring
and issuing downlink messages and commands to smart meters in smart grid systems.
• RTN Gateway (R-Gateway):R-Gateway is a network entity which serves as a relay be-
tween the control center and smart meters for transmissions. RTN Gateways direct mes-
sage to specific smart meter destinations.
• Smart Meters Network (SMs) {SM1, SM2, · · · }: Smart meters are an important com-
ponent that can electrically record the nearly real-time data concerning electrical con-
sumption. Smart meters only report data to R-Gateway. They also receive requests and
commands from the latter.
Communication Model. In the residential tree-based networks (RTN), we first construct a
tree-based network to allow downlink transmission coverage for smart meters in a local area;
further details are described network construction subsection below. Communication between
each SMi and the R-Gateway is through relatively cheap WiFi technology. However, when a
smart meters network range is large, it is impossible for some SMi to directly communicate
with R-Gateway. In this case, multi-hop communication will be formed in the RTN. On the
other hand, the communication between R-Gateway and the control center is dependent upon the
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high-bandwidth, low delay, reliable and secure channels. These can guarantee smart grid two-
way communication, facilitating for demand response, dynamic pricing, and system monitoring
in smart grid systems.
Figure 6.1: System model under consideration: a residential tree-based network (RTN) with a
number of smart meters (SMs) and RTN gateway.
6.2.2 Construction of Tree-based Network
We consider the residential smart meter networks as graphs G(V,E), where V denotes the set
of smart meters (i.e., vertices) and E denotes the set of wireless links (i.e., edges) between two
smart meters. In addition, residential tree-based networks are a minimum spanning tree, meaning
they contain smart meters with the smallest cost communication paths (i.e., shortest available
wireless links). More precisely, the graph should be connected and each smart meter should have
the shortest communication path to the gateway. A routing table contains all pertinent details
for network topology. Address information remain static throughout the network as shown in
Fig. 6.2. The control center takes advantage of this feature and can send commands to any smart
meter by leveraging the routing table. A copy of the routing table is deployed to all participating
smart meters at the installation phase in a top-down manner.
6.2.3 Security Requirements
Security is crucial for the success of secure smart meters communications as well as the pro-
tection of user’s privacy. In our security model, we consider the control center and the gateway
are trustable, and the consumers represented by smart meters are honest. However, there exists
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Figure 6.2: Routing Table:a residential tree-based network (RTN) with a number of smart meters
(SMs) and RTN gateway.
an adversary A which resides in the RTN, eavesdropping the control center’s messages. The
adversary A could also launch some active attacks to threaten the data integrity or could re-
motely disconnect smart meters. The adversary A can launch a passive attack against the RTN
and only monitors communications channel, threatening the privacy. Therefore, to prevent the
adversary A from violating the consumer privacy and detect a adversary A’s malicious actions
in the downlink transmission, the following security requirements should be satisfied.
• Downlink controlling messages should be secure. Only the authorized commands from the
control center can be accepted by smart meters. In other words, if a command is not from
the control center, the requested command will not be executed by the smart meter.
• Downlink data integrity should be provided. Data manipulation by unauthorized parties
(i.e., the adversary A) or even legitimate consumers should be detected. Only the control
center is in charge of issuing controlling messages to smart meters. Therefore, detection
of bogus data is expected to meet smart grid’s application requirements in uplink and
downlink transmission.
• User’s Privacy should be protected. Protection of consumer data is of paramount impor-
tance in uplink and downlink transmission. Although the adversary A can eavesdrop the
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WiFi communication in the RTN, it cannot identify the content of downlink messages and
cannot determine to whom these messages are destined to in smart meter network.
6.2.4 Design Goals
Under the aforementioned system model and security requirements, our intent is to develop an
efficient identity-based signcryption scheme (EIBSC) for privacy-preserving downlink data com-
munication to satisfy the aforementioned security requirements. Specifically, the following two
desirable goals should be achieved:
• Security and privacy preservation: As stated above, the proposed EIBSC scheme should
deliver real-time data security, data integrity, authentication as well as the residential con-
sumer privacy to satisfy the above security requirements. If the scheme does not satisfy
security requirements, then consumer privacy will be infringed. As a result, this will hinder
the proliferation of smart grids.
• Efficiency: The proposed scheme should also be efficient in regards to computational cost
and ciphertext size compared to existing schemes.
6.3 Bilinear Pairing
In this section, we recall the bilinear pairing technique [55], which serves as the basis of the
proposed scheme. Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of the same large prime order p, and
P1 ∈ G1 be the generator of G1. An admissible bilinear pairing ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is a map
with the following properties: i) Bilinearity: For all P,Q ∈ G1 and any a, b ∈ Z∗p, we have
ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab; ii) Non-degeneracy: ê(P1, P1) 6= 1G2; and iii) Computability: There
is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1. Such an admissible bilinear
pairing ê : G1 × G1 → G2 can be implemented by the modified Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic
curves [55].
Definition 2 (Bilinear Parameter Generator). A bilinear parameter generator Gen is a proba-
bilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input, and outputs a 5-tuple (p, P1,G1,G2, ê)
where p is a k-bit prime number, G1,G2 are two groups with order p, P1 ∈ G1, is a generator,
and ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map.
Next, we state the following three underlying problems, which serve as a basis of our pro-
posed scheme.
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Definition 3 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). The CDH problem is stated as
follows: Given the elements (P1, aP1, bP1) ∈ G1 for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗p , to compute abP1 ∈ G1.
Definition 4 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem). The BDH problem is stated as follows:
Given the elements (P1, aP1, bP1, cP1) ∈ G1 for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , to compute ê(P1, P1)abc ∈
G1.
6.4 Proposed EIBSC Scheme
In this section, we will present our identity based signcryption scheme (EIBSC). Before proceed-
ing to the scheme’s details, an overview of EIBSC is introduced.
6.4.1 Overview of EIBSC scheme
From time to time, utility companies represented by control centers need to send information
to remote smart meters in residential areas. While the topology of the residential area networks
is fixed and routing information is stored in the control center’s database, the control center
can send downlink data to smart meters using a hop-by-hop transport protocol; exploiting the
fixed tree-based network. Fig. 6.3 outlines such a multi-hop topology, where the gateway (R-
Gateway) serves as the root node of the smart meters network, and smart meters act as nodes
in the residential area. In order to achieve reliable multi-hop communication in a tree-based
network topology between the control center and smart meters, the control center first sends the
downlink messages to the gateway based on the network routing table. This in turn forwards the
messages to subsequent nodes. Moreover, in order to achieve efficient transmission, data integrity
and privacy in the downlink communication, the proposed scheme employs the signcryption
scheme and concealing technique. While the signcryption scheme performs digital signature and
encryption simultaneously, the concealing technique conceals the destination of the downlink
message. This makes it difficult for adversaries or even a legitimate consumer to discern to
whom a message is destined.
6.4.2 Description of EIBSC scheme
In this section, we will present our efficient Identity Based Signcryption (EIBSC) scheme. The
EIBSC scheme is composed mainly of four algorithms: system initialization algorithm, registra-
tion and private key extraction algorithm, signcryption algorithm, and unsigncryption algorithm.
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Figure 6.3: Fixed and reliable multi-hop downlink transmission for tree-based smart meters net-
work.
1) System Initialization
In the system initialization algorithm, the control center is responsible for system parameters
configuration. In particular, given the security parameter k, the control center first generates the
bilinear parameters (p, P1,G1,G2, ê) by running Gen(k), and chooses three secure cryptographic
hash functions H1, H2 and H3, where H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1; H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n where n is the
length of plaintext and H3 : {0, 1}n → Z∗p. Then, the control center picks a random number s ∈
Z∗p, and calculates Ppub = sP1. With these settings, the control center keeps s as the master key
secretly, and publishes the public parameters Params = (p, P1,G1,G2, n, ê, H1, H2, H3, Ppub).
2) Registration and Private Key Extraction
In this algorithm, the gateway gets initial authentication and submits its identity IDc to the
control center. The control center in turn uses the master secret key s to calculate the gateway’s
private key as Sc = sH1(IDc) and sends Sc back to the gateway over a secure channel. Similarly,
each smart meter SM1, SM2, · · · submits its identity (IDs) to the control center for registration
and obtains a private key as Ss = sH1(IDs) from the control center via a secure channel. More-
over, the control center’s identity and private key are IDg and Sg = sH1(IDg), respectively.
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3) Signcryption(Sg, IDs,m)
To signcrypt message m ∈ {0, 1}n, the signcryption performs encryption and signing simultane-
ously using the public parameters Params and (Sg, IDs,m) as follows:
• The control center generates a random integer r ∈ Z∗p, and
• Calculates C1 = rP1.
• Calculates Qs = H1(IDs).
• Calculates K = H2(ê(rQs, Ppub)).
• Calculates the ciphertext Cenc = m⊕K.
• Calculates h = H3(m).
• Calculates Csign = hSg + rPpub , where Sg is the control center’s private key.
• Output σ = (C1, Cenc, Csign) is the signcryption of the control center on message m.
After determining the destination, i.e., the smart meter (SMt with its IDt) that will receive the
signcrypted message, the control center runs Algorithm 3. This algorithm takes two inputs:
the destination and message m. It first constructs the path to the intended smart meter based on
the routing table of the residential tree-based network. Then, it performs signcryption (σ) and
chooses a random number t ∈ Z∗p to compute Chide = (t,H1(tSt)) where H1 is a cryptographic
hash function defined in the public parameters and St is the smart meter’s private key. Finally, it
returns three outputs: a set of smart meters TSMs containing the intended destination, concealing
value (Chide), and signcrypted message σ where σ is a 3-tuple (C1, Cenc, Csign).
4) Unsigncryption(Ss, IDg, σ)
unsigncryption algorithm is in charge of decrypting and verifying sent by the control center. The
intended smart meter needs to perform unsigncryption algorithm as follows:
• Calculates Qg = H1(IDg).
• Calculates K ′ = H2(ê(Ss, C1)).
• Calculates m = Cenc ⊕K ′.
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Algorithm 3 Concealing Technique and Multi-Hop Forwarding
INPUT: SMt, and m.
OUTPUT: (TSMs, Chide, σ).
1: procedure CONCEALING TECHNIQUE AND MULTI-HOP FORWARDING
2: Set TSMs= Select smart meters on the path to SMt.
3: if SMt is not leaf node then
4: if SMt+1 exists then
5: Add SMt+1 to TSMs . SMt+1 is the intermediate leaf node in the path.
6: else
7: Add SMt+k and ALL nodes SMt−n to TSMs . SMt−n are direct ancestors of
the non-intermediate leaf SMt+k
8: end if
9: end if
10: compute σ = Signcryption(Sg, IDs,m) . where IDt is the identity of SMt.
11: choose randomly r where r ← Z∗p.
12: compute Chide = (t,H1(tSt)).
13: return (TSMs, Chide, σ)
14: end procedure
• Calculates h = H3(m).
If the following equation 6.1 holds, then the decrypted message (m) is authenticated. Other-
wise, it is invalid and the downlink data will be rejected.
ê(P1, Csign)
?
= ê(Ppub, hQg + C1) (6.1)
The correctness of recovering the message is as follows:
• The sender calculates




• The recipient calculates





The correctness of equation 6.1 is as follows:
ê(P1, Csign) = ê(P1, hSg + rPpub)
= ê(P1, hsQg + rsP1)
= ê(P1, s(hQg + rP1))
= ê(P1, (hQg + rP1)
s)
= ê(sP1, hQg + rP1)
= ê(Ppub, hQg + C1).
In order to send a downlink message to a specific smart meter, the control center runs
Algorithm 3 and forwards the outputs of the algorithm, namely (TSMs, Chide, σ) to the gate-
way. The gateway, in turn further forwards the outputs to a subsequent smart meter in the tree-
based network (as in TSMs). Upon receiving outputs, each smart meter in TSMs, including the
intended smart meter will perform two tasks. The first one is to continue forwarding the mes-
sage (TSMs, Chide, σ) downlink according to the deployed routing table in the smart meter and
smart meters in TSMs. It is worth noting that the intended smart meter will continue to forward
the received message to other smart meters. In the example shown in Fig 6.4, suppose smart
meter 8 is the intended smart meter that will receive a message from its immediate parent, that
is, smart meter 4 and then will further forward down the received message to smart meter 9. As
a result, the real destination (or intended recipient) of a downlink smart grid communication is
concealed. Such a design not only efficiently assists in forwarding downlink communication, but
also prevents unauthorized entities from learning the destination of downlink messages, provid-
ing privacy preservation.
Figure 6.4: An illustration of concealing technique.
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The second task is to verify whether downlink data is intended to itself or not. This is done by
computing Cverify = H1(tSt) where St is the smart meter’s private key and t is extracted from
Chide. Cverify is compared to H1(tSt) extracted from Chide. if they are equal then the smart
meter recovers and verifies σ by running Unsigncryption(Ss, IDg, σ). Otherwise, Cverify does
not match Chide there is no need to perform Unsigncryption on σ.
6.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed EIBSC scheme. In particular,
following the security requirements discussed earlier, our analysis will focus on how the pro-
posed EIBSC scheme can achieve downlink message source authentication and data integrity as
well as consumer data privacy preservation.
• The proposed EIBSC scheme can provide the downlink messages source authentication.
Since the encrypted message Cenc, digital signature Csign and the value C1 in σ are based
on Definition 2 and 3 that are provably secure in the random oracle model [55] can be
intercepted and forged by adversary A, adversary A cannot encrypt any message with-
out knowing r which is randomly chosen from and used in C1 = rP1 and Cenc = m ⊕
H2(ê(rQs, Ppub)), and cannot sign any message without having a control center’s private
key used in Csign = hSg + rPpub. In other words, the intercepted and modified messages
(C̄1, C̄enc, C̄sign) are not the same (C1, Cenc, Csign) encrypted and signed by the control
center. In addition, since the proposed scheme employs a random integer in encryption,
it can resist the possible replay attack Thus, σ is resilient against forgery. The proposed
EIBSC scheme provides the downlink message source authentication.
• The proposed EIBSC scheme provides data integrity. Since the downlink messages are
signed (e.g., Csign = hSg + rPpub) by the control center’s signature, adversary A cannot
sign it without the control center’s signature which is provably secure under the BDH prob-
lem in the random oracle model [9]. Similarly, when a downlink message Cenc = m⊕K
where K is H2(ê(rQs, Ppub) is encrypted by the control center, it can resist deliberate
forgery attack. As a result, the adversary A’s malicious behaviors in the downlink trans-
mission can be detected in the proposed EIBSC scheme.
• The proposed EIBSC scheme can provide consumer data privacy preservation. The con-
cealing technique algorithm provides a mechanism preventing adversary A or legitimate
consumers on the smart grid from recognizing the destinations of downlink messages.
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Moreover, only the intended consumer will signcrypt the downlink message from the con-
trol center and the other participating consumers know nothing about the message and the
destination in communication which guarantees privacy preservation. Although the adver-
sary A can manipulate the downlink data, it cannot learn anything about communication
and such malicious behavior can be easily detected by the proposed scheme.
6.6 Performance Evaluation
The efficiency of the proposed scheme can be evaluated with respect to computational cost and ci-
phertext length. We first calculate the computation time for Signcryption and Unsigncryption
using an MNT curve of embedding degree k = 6 and 160-bit p on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ
machine [86]. Since the point multiplication in G1 and pairing computations dominate each
message’s computational overhead, only these operations are counted in the calculation. Table
6.1 shows the measured time (in milliseconds) for the aforementioned operations. In this table,
TPMUL denotes the time of point multiplication (that is, mul) in G1 and Tê denotes the time
pairing (that is, ê).
We have 4 point multiplication operations and 1 pairing operation in signcryption and 1 point
multiplication operation and 3 pairing operations in unsigncryption. Accordingly, the execution
time of signcryption would be as follows:
Tsign = 4× TPMUL + 1× Tê = 4× 0.6 + 1× 4.5 = 6.9 ms.
While the execution time of unsigncryption is calculated as:
Tunsign = 1× TPMUL + 4× Tê = 1× 0.6 + 3× 4.5 = 13.5 ms.




In order to show the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we compare the proposed scheme
with two ID-based signcryption schemes Libert-Quisquater [49] and Lal et al. [50] implemented
according to their original descriptions. Table 6.2 gives the detailed computations and total
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execution time in these schemes compared to our proposed scheme. We can see from these
results that the proposed scheme outperforms the competing schemes in terms of computational
costs. Table 6.2 also shows the ciphertext-size of the comparative schemes. We can see the
length of a signcrypted text of the proposed scheme is similar to the length in Libert-Quisquater.
Table 6.2: Computational overhead and ciphertext-size
Schemes Signcryption Unsigncyption Ciphertext-size
mul ê time(ms) mul ê time(ms
Libert-Quisquater [49] 2 2 10.2 1 4 18.6 |m|+ |Z∗p|+ |G|
Lal et al. [50] 6 1 8.1 1 3 13.5 |m|+ |G|
EIBSC 4 1 6.9 1 3 13.5 |m|+ 2|G|
6.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient identity-based signcryption scheme for privacy-
preserving data in downlink communication, called EIBSC, for smart grid. Compared to other
identity-based signcryption schemes, the proposed scheme can efficiently achieve privacy-preserving
data in downlink communication from the control center to smart meter networks in residential
areas. The proposed scheme employs concealing techniques to provide privacy preservation.
Additionally, the proposed scheme is much more efficient in regards to computational overhead
and ciphertext size. Our security analysis has shown that the proposed scheme can resist various
security threats in smart grids.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize our contributions in this thesis and propose our future research
work.
7.1 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• First, we propose a novel data sharing framework for the smart grid, where two popular
infrastructure are combined: the smart grid and cloud computing together. The proposed
framework allows the electricity consumption reports generated in smart grid to be stored
in the cloud, and the distributed energy resources can obtain the statistics and analysis
results from the cloud computing. Therefore, the proposed framework can take advantage
of cloud computing for the smart grid. Additionally, the proposed framework makes use
of the homomorphic encryption technique to facilitate the statistics and analysis on the
encrypted electricity consumption reports, and the proxy re-encryption technique to keep
the statistics and analysis results secret from the cloud.
• Second, by considering residential user privacy and efficiency issues in data aggregation
in a Residential Area Network (RAN) of smart meter devices, we propose an efficient
lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme (ELPDA)to address the security
and privacy challenges. In ELPDA, based on one-time masking technique, each smart
meter’s data can be efficiently encrypted and aggregated. Compared with popular Paillier
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Cryptosystem based aggregation (PCBA) algorithm applied in smart grid, the proposed
ELPDA is much more efficient, reducing the aggregation delay in the whole RAN. Addi-
tionally, We carry out extensive simulations to examine the average aggregation delay in
ELPDA. The simulation results will demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed ELPDA
scheme. ELPDA outperforms the PCBA algorithms in terms of average aggregation delay
in smart grid.
• Third, inspired by the facts that the gateways may be corrupted, we present a security-
enhanced data aggregation scheme from trapdoor hash functions, Pailliar encryption and
homomorphic authenticators. To the best of our knowledge our proposed scheme is the
first one against malicious gateways and a successful attempt to construct authentication
schemes from trapdoor hash functions with key exposure. We analyze the security strength
and performance of the security-enhanced data aggregation scheme. In particular, we em-
ploy provable security technique to reduce the security of our scheme to the well-known
mathematical hard problems and underlying cryptographic tools. Through the performance
comparison, we demonstrated that our scheme is indeed significantly more efficient than
the existing schemes in terms of both communication and computational overheads.
• Fourth, for downlink communication in smart gird we propose an identity-based sign-
cryption scheme implemented concealing technique in order to protect consumer privacy,
authenticity and data integrity. The proposed scheme (EIBSC) implements a tree-based
network in which downlink communication can be much more efficient using minimum
spanning trees and privacy preservation is provided using the concealing destination tech-
nique and identity-based signcryption. Additionally, the proposed scheme (EIBSC) is
much more efficient in terms of computational costs and ciphertext size compared to other
signcryption schemes and outperforms existing competing schemes.
7.2 Future Work
In the future work, we plan not only to study the methods to design data aggregation schemes
that are able to detect and trace the misbehaviors of legitimate consumers in smart grid, but also
to design a concrete scheme supporting our requirements for the proposed framework and full
homomorphism.
Since supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) is a crucial system in modern in-
dustry such water and waste water, energy and smart grid, we also plan to further investigate
SCADA and malware in order to satisfy significant security features for smart grid.
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While there is no general solution or scheme for a wide variety of many privacy issues in
smart grid and how we should properly address them using different techniques, we plan to
investigate differential privacy as a promising topic. Unlike other types of privacy models, dif-
ferential privacy might be applied to statistical databases and micro-data datasets for smart grid in
order to preserve consumer data privacy. Differential privacy protects the privacy of aggregated
datasets, but might not protect privacy in data aggregation. Therefore, differential privacy can
be applied in a specific setting in order to learn as much as possible about a group in a database
while learning as little as possible about a single individual(i.e., a householders or consumer).
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